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Abstract—Smart contract has been regarded as one of the
most promising and appealing notions in blockchain technology.
Its self-enforcing and event-driven features make some online
activities possible without a trusted third party, especially those
related to financial and business. However, problems such as high
security risk and low processing rate prevent it from being widely
applied. In order to facilitate the construction of secure smart
contract, and to improve the execution performance, various
schemes and tools are proposed. However, to our best knowledge,
a comprehensive survey for these proposals is absent, hindering
new researchers and developers from a quick start.
This paper surveys the literature on constructing and executing
smart contracts over the period 2008-2020. We review the litera-
ture in three categories: 1) design paradigms that give examples
and patterns on contract construction; 2) design tools that
facilitate the development of secure smart contracts by providing
security analysis or other auxiliary helps; and 3) extensions and
alternative systems that improve the privacy or efficiency of smart
contract executions. We start by a brief introduction of essential
backgrounds, and then investigate the contract construction
schemes on the most prevalent and representative smart contract
platforms, i.e., Bitcoin and Ethereum. We list and group them
into the first two categories according to their utility. As for
the last category, we review the existing contract execution
mechanisms, and further divide the state-of-the-art solutions into
three classes: private contracts with auxiliary tools, off-chain
channels, and extensions on the core functionality. Finally, we
summarize the future research directions towards secure and
privacy-preserving smart contracts. As far as we know, our work
is the first systematic survey on schemes of contract construction
and execution.
Index Terms—smart contract; contract construction; contract
execution; blockchain; security analysis; efficient development;
privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
THE advent of Bitcoin [1] in 2008 marks the birth ofcryptocurrencies, which are maintained without trusted
third parties (TTP). Since then, numerous cryptocurrencies
have emerged. Unlike traditional fiat currencies issued by gov-
ernments, cryptocurrencies circulate in specific computer pro-
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grams through peer-to-peer (P2P) technology, where no leader
or dominant node is responsible for message transmission.
Cryptocurrencies are equipped with numerous cryptographic
and game-theoretic schemes that ensure their safe circulation
on the Internet.
The core technology that enables the cryptocurrencies is
blockchain, which ensures data consistency among distributed
nodes in a P2P network without mutual trust. Later in 2014,
Ethereum [2], [3] extended Bitcoin and introduced the concept
of smart contract [4] into blockchain, which greatly enriches
the application scenarios of blockchain, and becomes one of
the most promoting motivations of blockchain technology.
After the birth of Ethereum, applications of smart contracts
gradually become prevalent, and many other platforms are
derived. In 2016, Corda [5] came out as a distributed ledger
platform for the financial services industry, aimed at improving
the transaction processing rate. For the privacy concerns on
smart contracts, Quorum [6] introduces private state trie and
other technical methods into Ethereum, so as to support the
execution of private contracts. The Hyperledger Fabric [7]
system led by IBM further facilitates the application of smart
contracts, by allowing companies or consortium to run it
collaboratively, so as to improve the transaction processing rate
while keeping the data consistent and non-malleable. Since
2015, smart contracts in Hyperledger Fabric have been widely
used in supply chain, education, business and others.
From the academic perspective, researchers are mostly
dedicated to the design schemes or improvements on public
blockchains where everyone could join, especially Bitcoin and
Ethereum, since the problems occur in these platforms are
most typical and also influence the other derived systems.
Also, the research results in these platforms can be easily
migrated into others.
One of the biggest issues on blockchain and smart contract
technology is that all transaction details are public. This
might cause the leakage of users’ privacy, even with the
pseudonym mechanism (i.e., identifying and clustering users
with pseudonyms) [8], [9]. Moreover, since transactions are
executed and validated by all participating nodes in a dupli-
cated way, the transaction rate (or throughput) is quite limited
in the blockchain system. Both the privacy and efficiency
problems hinder many applications to be implemented as smart
contracts. This makes the state-of-the-art smart contracts only
applicable in a small number of fields.
Considering the security aspect, there are also concerns
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2that smart contracts are vulnerable to hacker attacks. One
infamous example is the attack against the crowdfunding
project Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) in
2016. DAO relies on a smart contract on Ethereum. Developers
collect crowdfunding for their blockchain-based applications,
and investors are rewarded in return. However, there is a
vulnerability in the contract code [10], which is exploited to
transfer funds out of the DAO contract by the attacker, and
finally causes a loss of funds worth about 60 million dollars at
that time. This attack changes the attitude of investors towards
smart contracts, and it consequently hinders the development
of smart contract and blockchain technology.
The DAO event is just one of typical attacks against
smart contracts. Since smart contracts usually involve financial
transactions, any attack may cause a severe economic loss.
Consequently, compared with normal programming, the design
of smart contracts has higher security requirements. This
makes it more difficult for ordinary users to write secure smart
contracts by themselves, which further inhibits the popularity
of smart contracts in other industries.
To sum up, issues on security, privacy and transaction rate
are the main obstacles for the universal adoption of smart
contracts. Though fresh this research field is, there have been
various schemes on the construction and execution aspects of
smart contracts, to overcome such barriers and promote the
development and adoption of smart contracts. In this paper, we
conduct a systematic survey of these schemes over the period
2008-2020, aiming at providing a comprehensive review of
the smart contract technology, and helping new researchers
and developers to have a quick start.
Our Contributions. We conduct a survey on the construction
and execution schemes of smart contracts from the per-
spectives of paradigms, tools and systems, over the period
2008-2020. We believe that our work will give insights to
researchers and developers who are new to smart contracts,
and provide an holistic technical perspective on contract
construction and execution schemes. Our main contributions
are as follows:
(1) We provide the essential background knowledge on
blockchain and smart contracts, especially the contract ex-
ecution mechanisms, to provide new incomers of this field
an overall impression of the related concepts. Moreover,
we give several necessary definitions to help readers have
a better understanding of this work.
(2) We divide existing blockchain systems that support
smart contracts into script-based and Turing-complete
blockchains, with Bitcoin and Ethereum as representatives,
respectively. Then we systematically classify and analyze
the contract construction schemes in these platforms.
(3) We list several drawbacks and limitations of the existing
mainstream blockchain execution mechanisms. We then
investigate and categorize the extensions and alternative
systems that are aimed at mitigating these problems.
(4) We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the state-of-
the-art solutions that address the privacy and efficiency
issues in both contract construction and execution aspects,
and point out several future research directions on the
aspects of smart contract construction and execution.
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Fig. 1. Data structure of the Bitcoin blockchain.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is as follows.
Section II introduces the background, preliminaries and related
work. Section III provides the systematization methodology of
this paper. Section IV and Section V describe the construc-
tion schemes of smart contracts in script-based and Turing-
complete blockchains, taking Bitcoin and Ethereum as repre-
sentatives, respectively. Section VI discusses various solutions
and extensions to improve the privacy and efficiency of the
contract execution mechanisms. Section VII outlines several
further research directions of smart contract construction and
execution. Finally, Section VIII provides a conclusion of this
paper.
II. BACKGROUND, PRELIMINARY AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we firstly provide the essential background
in Section II-A, then give the relevant definitions and nota-
tions in Section II-B and finally present the related work in
Section II-C.
A. Background
The background information for this study is given in the
following: we first give a brief impression about the blockchain
technology in Section II-A1, and then explain the concept
of smart contract that is widely supported by mainstream
blockchains in Section II-A2.
1) Blockchain: Informally, a blockchain is a sequence of
blocks linked with hash values. Transactions that deliver
messages among users and interact with the blockchain are
stored in the body of each block, while digest information and
other identifiers are recorded in the block header. A blockchain
is maintained by the nodes participating in the network and
the data consistency among the nodes is ensured according to
some predetermined rules called consensus.
We take the Bitcoin blockchain as an example and illustrate
its structure in Fig. 1. It is formed by linking multiple blocks
in sequence with their hash values. Each block consists of a
block header and a block body. Specifically, a block header
includes a hash value of the previous block HPrev, a version
number v of current consensus rule, a current mining difficulty
3parameter d, a timestamp t, a Merkle root of transactions Hroot
and a random nonce nr . A block body includes transactions
Txj∈N∗ that are used to calculate Hroot. As is shown in Fig. 1,
every two adjacent hash values are combined to calculate the
hash in the upper layer. If there is a single node left at the
end, it will be duplicated and combined with itself, as shown in
the path of H5 → H55 → H5555. Note that the contents in the
dotted box in Fig. 1 are only used to illustrate the calculation
of Hroot and not included in the block.
In the Bitcoin blockchain, the verification of new blocks
is simplified due to the separation of block headers and
bodies. Cryptographic schemes (such as hash function and
Merkle tree) are adopted to guarantee the tamper resistance
and consistency of data. Each node can individually calculate
the final state by executing all transactions in order from
the genesis block, i.e., the initial block of the blockchain.
In this way, a central trusted third party is eliminated from
the system, and any individual party cannot interrupt the
operation in blockchain. For more technical details about
Bitcoin blockchain, readers may refer to [11]. We remark that
the blockchain structure discussed above is widely adopted by
other derived systems, e.g., Ethereum, Corda, Quorum, etc.,
and the introduction of these blockchains are omitted here.
2) Smart Contract: The concept of smart contracts was
first proposed by Szabo [4] in 1997, referred to a multi-party
protocol that could be automatically enforced without a trusted
third party. Without practical implementation, it did not receive
enough attention at that time. Several years later, with the birth
and development of blockchain, smart contracts are brought
back into practice.
In the blockchain context, smart contracts are usually de-
fined as event-driven computer programs executed and en-
forced by all participants in a P2P network. In each smart
contract, there are public interfaces that deal with relevant
events. These interfaces are invoked by the transactions with
proper payload data (Definition 9), and all valid transactions
are recorded on the blockchain. Formal definitions of smart
contracts and some other related concepts are provided in
Section II-B2.
Bitcoin supports a set of scripts that enable the auto-
enforcement of some special financial affairs other than plain
electronic cash exchange. This procedure can be considered as
the prototype of smart contracts. In the early years, some re-
searchers implement zero-knowledge contingent payment [12]
to achieve fair exchange of electronic goods. On this basis,
more and more smart contracts [13] come out. However, the
scripts in Bitcoin only support a limited number of operations,
so they are only applicable in restricted scenarios.
Ethereum introduces a new virtual machine structure and
supports Turing-complete programming languages, which
greatly enrich the functionalities of smart contracts. Specif-
ically, Ethereum supports the execution of arbitrary determin-
istic computer programs in theory. The underlying Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM) recognizes a low-level language called
EVM bytecode. In order to reduce the learning cost and
improve the efficiency of development, several high-level
programming languages are proposed, e.g., Solidity [14] and
Serpent [15], whose grammar is similar to that of mainstream
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Fig. 2. Workflow of the blockchain supporting smart contracts. After receiving
Tx1,call and Tx2,call, the miners (i.e., executors) verify and package the
transactions into the latest block, i.e., Blocki+2. Finally, the World State,
which contains all the states, is updated accordingly.
programming languages. Contracts written in these high-level
languages can be compiled into EVM bytecode with appro-
priate compilers.
Fig. 2 shows the workflow of a blockchain that supports
smart contracts, where the brown arrows represent the pro-
cesses of deploying a smart contract through the creation
transaction Txcreate. In the development stage, some construc-
tion tools are used to facilitate the design of contracts. Then
some analysis tools are used to confirm the security and
correctness of the contract (Definition 13, 14). The blue and
red arrows refer to the call from smart contracts and users,
respectively. After receiving Tx1,call and Tx2,call, the miners
(i.e., executors of these transactions) verify and package the
transactions into the latest block, i.e., Blocki+2, following the
execution mechanism. After the block is accepted by the whole
network, the World State, which contains all the states, is
updated accordingly.
From another point of view, the execution mechanism
among different platforms varies. In the following, we give
a brief introduction of the execution mechanisms in Sec-
tion II-A2a and Section II-A2b, respectively, taking Bitcoin
and Ethereum as representatives.
a) Contract execution in Bitcoin: Smart contracts in
Bitcoin mostly refer to the transactions setting script hashes as
output addresses (Pay to Script Hash, P2SH), which encode the
hashes of scripts into Bitcoin UTXOs (Definition 10). P2SH
transactions are the basis for multi-signature (MultiSig) [16]
transactions, Lightning Network [17] and other technologies
in Bitcoin ecosystem.
Fig. 3 shows a simplified payment process in Bitcoin, where
the time field is omitted. When dealing with a transaction that
spends UTXOs from a P2SH transaction, the miners first verify
the sender’s signature. Then they check that whether the script
code in the transaction payload matches the corresponding
script hash Hscript. Finally, they check that whether the other
payload data pdata makes the script evaluated to true.
In Bitcoin, it takes approximately 10 minutes to append a
new block to the blockchain. Moreover, it is recommended
to wait for at least a sequence of 6 blocks to make sure
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Fig. 3. P2SH transactions used in smart contracts (the time field is omitted
here). Bob spends the UTXO in the script hash Hscript by providing the correct
pdata, which contains the scripts matching the Hscript and the payload data
that make the script evaluated to true.
that the transactions indeed take effect and cannot be erased
or forked, with an overwhelming probability. This introduces
a huge delay on the transaction confirmation, which further
limits the implementation of Bitcoin smart contracts.
In addition, since the information on the Bitcoin blockchain
is publicly available, the full scripts are exposed to the entire
network. Even though Bitcoin is equipped with a pseudonym
mechanism, the leakage of such private information is still
inevitable. Curious readers may refer to the work of Conti et
al. [18] for a more detailed survey on privacy issues in Bitcoin.
b) Contract execution in Ethereum: The Turing-complete
programming languages in Ethereum greatly extend the ap-
plication scenario of smart contracts. Theoretically, smart
contracts in Ethereum can realize any deterministic program.
These contracts are executed by the EVM, whose formal def-
inition and execution mechanism are elaborated in Ethereum
Yellow Paper [3].
Ethereum adopts the account model (Definition 11), where
an account of a smart contract has the same status as that of
a user. In other words, a contract account has the same ability
to send transactions and trigger or create contracts as that of
a personal account.
Transactions are handled by miners who run the EVM. After
a transaction is included in the blockchain, the balance in the
corresponding account and the variables in the contract are
updated according to the transaction contents and the rules
defined by the contract code.
In order to prevent potential Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
(e.g., non-stop execution caused by an infinite loop), Ethereum
introduces the gas mechanism. Namely, each operation con-
sumes a certain amount of gas, and the upper bound of gas
consumption is set and paid in advance in the transaction.
If the execution of the contract function is not terminated
before the exhaustion of gas, the contract will be reverted to
the initial states before the triggering of this function, and all
the consumed gas will be charged by the miners as execution
fees. However, this on the other hand limits the complexity of
smart contracts.
In addition, similar to Bitcoin, smart contracts in Ethereum
also suffers from privacy leakage. Several schemes have been
proposed to handle such privacy issues and will be discussed
later in this paper.
B. Preliminary
For completeness and unity, we give the notations used in
our work in Section II-B1. On the other side, to provide a
better understanding, we list several essential definitions that
occur frequently in this paper in Section II-B2.
1) Notations: As mentioned in Section I, the security prob-
lems on smart contracts are serious and should be carefully
settled. Therefore, relevant solutions for contract construction
and execution usually come with a formal security proof,
which might involve mathematical models or cryptographic
primitives. To make these schemes present in a uniform style,
we make an effort to unify the notations in our work, as shown
in the following.
Sets are denoted with upper-case calligraphic letters, e.g.,
T denotes the set of valid transactions for a contract.
For most functions, F is used, along with a subscript
denoting the particular usage of this function, e.g., Fneg, the
negligible function with some security parameter. Some other
functions or primitives may be denoted with Greek letters, e.g.,
φ for the primitive that evaluates the witness ω.
Tuples are denoted with upper-case letters, e.g., U denotes
an unspent transaction output (UTXO, Definition 10). A dot
operation is used to refer to the component inside a tuple, e.g.,
U.v denotes the value of a UTXO. Tx is used for a transaction,
and Tx.in,Tx.out,Tx.id and Tx.pld denote a transaction’s
input, output, identifier and payload data, respectively.
Arbitrary-length sequences are denoted as bold lower-case
abbreviations, e.g., buf, the stack of buffers. Square brackets
are used to index individual components, e.g., buf[0], the first
item on the buffer stack.
Scalars and variables are denoted with a lower-case letter,
e.g., n is often used to denote the number of participants, and
i, j, k are often used as indexes to refer to the members in a
set. Moreover, those with a special meaning may be Greek,
e.g., σ, denotes a digital signature.
For the names of proposed schemes, we adopt the original
text styles in the literature, e.g. OYENTE, Hawk, etc.
Besides, some special representations are used for particular
meanings. Hash values are denoted with H, whose subscripts
may be strings with special meanings, e.g., Hroot, the root
hash of a Merkle tree. Time is denoted with t. We use Bx
to represent x bitcoins. Smart contracts are usually denoted
with C, while for those with particular meaning, the typewriter
abbreviations are used, e.g., HTLC, the hash timelock contract.
Greek letters like β, γ are used to denote payment channels
and state channels. Protocols are denoted with pi. The letter
A is used especially to denote an adversary. Participants in
a protocol or contract are denoted as P, which often comes
with subscripts like numbers (e.g., P1, the first participant) and
letters (e.g., Ps , the sender). Address, usually a string in the
context of blockchain, is denoted with a, and with subscripts
denoting the usage of this address, e.g., amul is the multi-sig
address in the Bitcoin context. Ideal functionalities are denoted
with F ∗, and the message headers in these functionalities are
represented with the small capital letters, e.g., DEPOSIT.
As for operations, we use s ← 0 to denote the operation
of assigning value 0 to s, and s ←$ {0, 1}128 to denote that
s is uniformly picked at random from the set {0, 1}128. The
5operation → is used to denote the concatenation of several
nodes that forms a path, as already shown in Fig. 1, the path
H5 → H55 → H5555. 〈P,V〉 is used to denote the interaction
of two Turing machines P and V . Concatenation of strings are
denoted with | | and the XOR of same-length binary elements
with ⊗.
2) Definitions: We give and rephrase some essential defi-
nitions and concepts frequently used in our work here. Defi-
nitions that are only used once are introduced when they first
appear in the context.
First of all, with the development of blockchain tech-
nology, there have been several kinds of blockchains with
distinct properties. According to the works of [19] and [20],
blockchains can be divided into three categories as follows:
Definition 1 (Public Blockchain): In a public blockchain,
any node is permitted to join the maintenance of data on
blockchain, and the data is publicly visible and verifiable.
Besides, anyone is allowed to deploy, call and execute smart
contracts.
Definition 2 (Consortium Blockchain): In a consortium
blockchain, the nodes that are responsible for maintaining the
data are determined in advance, and only these consortium
members can access data on the blockchain or deploy, call,
and execute smart contracts.
Definition 3 (Private Blockchain): A private blockchain
usually refers to a blockchain that is completely controlled
by an individual party. It is only used to record private
information, and only the owner has the rights to access and
modify the data.
In practice, common public blockchains include Bitcoin [1],
Ethereum [2], [3], etc., and common consortium blockchains
include Corda [5], Quorum [6], Hyperledger Fabric [7], etc.
Both public and consortium blockchains mentioned above can
be considered as private blockchains when running locally.
Next, to better understand the execution mechanism of the
blockchain, we give the definition of consensus that is one
of the key techniques within the blockchain, according to the
works of [21] and [22]:
Definition 4 (Consensus): A consensus mechanism enables
all participating nodes, whether honest or malicious ones,
to agree on the contents in a blockchain. In a consensus
mechanism, the following properties must be satisfied:
• Liveness: any transaction should be finally processed;
• Persistence: if an honest party validates a transaction
(accept or reject), all other honest nodes will eventually
have the same operation.
In many related works, the notion of miners is used to refer
to the participants in a blockchain system. We give a simple
definition of it as follows.
Definition 5 (Miner): A miner refers to a node providing its
non-trivial work in a consensus mechanism for the rewards in
a blockchain.
During the maintenance of a blockchain within the consen-
sus mechanism, there are cases when nodes disagree on the
final results. This is called a fork in the context of blockchain:
Definition 6 (Fork): A fork refers to an disagreement on
blockchain records among participating nodes.
Forks are usually temporal and will finally be eliminated by
the consensus rule. But under other circumstances, a fork may
be deliberately triggered, to launch an update of the blockchain
system. The concept of fork can be further divided into the
soft and hard forks, as defined below.
Definition 7 (Soft Fork): A soft fork refers to a fork caused
by the update of backward compatible consensus.
After a soft fork [23], some transactions or blocks that are
valid under the old rules may become invalid.
Definition 8 (Hard Fork): A hard fork refers to the fork
caused by the update of non-backward compatible consensus.
After a hard fork [23], the transactions or blocks under the
new rules become invalid under the old rules.
A soft fork is mainly used to introduce new types of trans-
actions, or to fix some bugs in the consensus protocol. It does
not require all nodes to switch to the new consensus. Nodes
running the old consensus can still recognize the transactions
and blocks under the new rules. While in comparison, a hard
fork usually arises when big events (e.g., the DAO attack)
or major disputes in community occur, and all nodes have
to choose one of the forks, and end up with two distinct
blockchains that are not compatible with each other.
In blockchain systems, users and smart contracts rely on
transactions to contact with each other. Therefore, we give a
universal definition of a transaction as the following:
Definition 9 (Transaction): A transaction Tx is a tuple of 5
elements, i.e.:
Tx = (t, in, out, s, pld)
where Tx.t is the timestamp that a miner receives Tx. We as-
sume that at most one Tx could be received at time t, namely,
∀i , j,Txi .t , Txj .t always holds. With this assumption,
transactions will be executed in chronological order (this order
may vary among miners). Tx.in (resp. Tx.out) is the input
(resp. output) of the transaction. Tx.s is the signature of the
transaction, which is used to show the ownership of the fund
to be transferred in the transaction. Tx.pld refers to arbitrary
messages appended to the transaction, and it is called payload
data in this paper.
In fact, the specific contents of a transaction vary among
blockchains, according to the underlying user model. Taking
Bitcoin and Ethereum as examples, Bitcoin adopts the unspent
transaction output (UTXO) model, while Ethereum uses the
account model. This is one of the key differences between
these two platforms, and most existing blockchains also adopt
either one of these two models. Therefore, we give the
definitions of the UTXO and account model in the following:
Definition 10 (UTXO Model): In the UTXO model, unspent
money is stored in UTXOs. Each transaction consumes exist-
ing UTXOs and generates new UTXOs, except the coinbase
transaction which assigns the miner a UTXO without inputs as
a reward. For a UTXO U, it contains information such as the
source addresses and the values. For a transaction Tx within
the UTXO model, the sum of values in the output UTXOs
must be more than or equal to that in the input UTXOs, i.e.:∑
U∈Tx.out
U.v ≥
∑
U∈Tx.in
U.v
6where U.v refers to the value of U, and the extra value in the
input is collected by the miners as the execution fee.
Definition 11 (Account Model): In the account model, each
user or contract has a fixed account and address. The account
records the balance, the contract codes, and the state data
specified in the creating transaction. The balance Fbalance(a) in
the account corresponding to address a must be non-negative.
In addition, for a transaction to be valid, the input amount
Tx.in to be spent should be less than or equal to the balance
in the account, i.e.:
Fbalance(a) ≥ 0, Fvalue(Tx.in) ≤ Fbalance(a)
where Fvalue(Tx.in) indicates the value contained in Tx.in.
As is mentioned before, the transaction data structure is
different among blockchains within these two models. Specif-
ically, in the UTXO model, Tx.in includes a set of UTXOs
to be spent, while in the account model, it directly refers to
the value to be transferred. Similarly, Tx.out includes a new
UTXO set in the UTXO model, while it includes responses
from the target address (e.g., returned messages from a smart
contract) in the account model.
With the above definitions of transactions, UTXO and ac-
count models, we are able to give a formal definition of smart
contracts here. We remark that our definition is inspired by
the description of the world state and transactions in Ethereum
Yellow Paper [3] , and the ideal functionality F ∗StCon of smart
contracts in [24].
Definition 12 (Smart Contract): A smart contract refers to
a computer program C deployed on a blockchain with public
interfaces and state variables, satisfying:
C(Si,Txi) = (Sj, Ri)
where S = {Si∈N∗ } is the set of all possible states in C, T =
{Txi∈N∗ = (t, in, out, s, pld)i∈N∗ } is the transaction set, and
R = {Ri∈N∗ } is the set of possible responses. Ri could be the
success or failure symbol of execution, or any other predefined
values. After C is called by a valid Txi , the new state Sj , and
the response Ri are produced accordingly.
We remark that the smart contracts discussed in this paper
refer to those in the blockchain context, and we sometimes
use the word contract for short.
Studies on smart contracts mainly focus on two aspects,
which are defined as security and correctness in this paper:
Definition 13 (Security of Smart Contracts): The security
of smart contracts refers to their ability to resist unauthorized
state change, including fund transferring, state tampering,
accidental self-destruction, etc.
Definition 14 (Correctness of Smart Contracts): The cor-
rectness of smart contracts refers to their ability to correctly
realize the expected functionality.
To ensure the security and correctness of smart contracts,
and to achieve other desired properties such as privacy, effi-
ciency, etc., some cryptographic schemes and hardware equip-
ment may be introduced. Here we briefly give the definitions
of secure multi-party computation (SMPC), zero-knowledge
proof (ZKP) and trusted execution environment (TEE) in the
following:
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Fig. 4. Related work on construction and execution mechanisms of smart
contracts.
Definition 15 (Secure Multi-party Computation): In a se-
cure multi-party computation (SMPC) protocol pi, participants
P1, P2, · · · , Pn can jointly calculate a probabilistic polyno-
mial time function f (x1, x2, · · · , xn) = (y1, y2, · · · , yn) where
xi (resp. yi) is the secret input (resp. output) of Pi (i =
1, 2, · · · , n), and the following two properties [25], [26] hold:
• Correctness: each Pi gets the correct result;
• Privacy: any Pi cannot get extra information except his
own input and output, especially the inputs and outputs
of other participants Pj where j , i.
Definition 16 (Zero-Knowledge Proof): In a proof system
〈P,V〉(x), a prover P proves to a verifier V that x belongs to
a language L, which is an NP problem, i.e., x ∈ L, L ∈ NP.
A protocol pi is said to be a zero-knowledge proof protocol,
if the following three properties [27] are satisfied:
• Completeness: any true statement can be accepted with
an overwhelming probability.
• Soundness: any false statement can only be accepted with
a negligible probability.
• Zero-knowledge: any probabilistic polynomial time veri-
fier cannot get extra information other than x ∈ L, and its
view is indistinguishable from that of a simulator Fsim.
Definition 17 (Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)):
TEE [28] is a kind of hardware equipment, usually an enclave
in the memory, which ensures that the execution environment
is not influenced or manipulated. TEE guarantees the reliability
of the execution results and the privacy of executed contents.
C. Related Work
Smart contract is an important aspect of the blockchain. Its
execution characteristics, efficiency, and security are directly
related to the acceptance of this emerging technology. Prior to
our work, there have been several surveys on the characteristics
of contract platforms (e.g., ease of use, efficiency, etc.),
properties of the contracts (e.g., security, privacy, etc.) and
related analysis tools, as shown in Fig. 4.
1) Characteristics of platforms: Seijas et al. [29] discuss
the languages adopted by the blockchain systems such as
Bitcoin, Nxt [40] and Ethereum, list the defects of these
languages. Furthermore, they give some directions that may
help to expand the functionality and enforce the security of
smart contracts, such as zero-knowledge proofs, static analysis,
etc. Bartoletti et al. [30] compare 6 smart contract platforms
in 2017, which are Bitcoin, Ethereum, Counterparty [41],
7Stellar [42], Monax [43] and Lisk [44]. Junis et al. [36] briefly
present a basic concept of blockchain and smart contract.
2) Properties of contracts: We consider the security, pri-
vacy and performance aspects of smart contracts. Alharby
et al. [31] investigate 24 papers related to smart contracts.
They point out that most research focuses on the problems
arising from the application of smart contracts and their
corresponding solutions. These issues are divided into con-
tract construction, secure execution, privacy and performance.
From the practical perspective, Atzei et al. [32] specifically
summarize the vulnerabilities of smart contracts in Ethereum.
They categorize the weaknesses in Ethereum to facilitate the
future development or research on smart contracts, including:
1) dependence on the order of transactions; 2) dependence on
timestamps; 3) mishandling of errors; 4) re-entrancy attacks,
etc. (see more details in Section V-B). Dika [33] analyzes
smart contracts in Ethereum from a higher point of view,
and categorizes the weaknesses into three levels: blockchain,
virtual machine (EVM), and programming language (Solidity).
In addition, Dika also proposes a contract security analysis tool
for detecting these weaknesses. Macrinici et al. [34] collect 64
papers on the issues related to the smart contract applications,
and outline 16 sub-problems, which can be further summarized
into three categories: problems on blockchain mechanism,
contract programs, and virtual machine. Among them, the
problems on the contract programs and virtual machine are to
some extent similar to the contract construction and execution
schemes. However, the authors only list the problems, but
fail to elaborate on the solutions to these problems. Harz et
al. [35] conduct an analysis of the languages and security tools
designed for smart contracts in 2018, and give a classification
and brief introduction.
In terms of analysis of application scenarios of smart con-
tracts, Bartoletti et al. [30] analyze smart contracts on Bitcoin
and Ethereum up to 2017, and divide the application scenarios
into: financial, notary, game, wallet, library and others. They
focus on the quatitative statistics in the application layer,
aiming to give an impression on the usage of contracts in
different applications.
Besides, Ayman et al. [37] analyze the problems encoun-
tered by developers according to the number of questions in the
Stackoverflow forum, and conclude the trend in development
of smart contract based on the statistical results.
3) Analysis tools: Angelo and Salzer [38] investigate 27
tools for Ethereum contracts from the aspects of open source,
maturity, adopted methods and security issues, etc. At the
same time, 53 papers related to smart contract security are
summarized in [39], and are classified from the aspects of
security and correctness. Compared with these two studies, our
work covers more up-to-date analysis tools and additionally
describes the smart contract construction schemes, tools and
execution mechanisms, forming a more systematic knowledge
of the studies on smart contracts.
The latest work of Ante [45] does a similar work to
ours. They analyze the smart-contract-related literature and
provide statistical results of related articles, such as the citation
statistics, distribution of keywords and the most concerned
smart contract platforms, etc. Finally, they identify 6 directions
of state-of-the-art research about the smart contracts according
to their quantitative analysis. Different from Ante’s work,
we start from a high-level perspective and discuss the topics
related to the contract construction and execution schemes with
more details, aiming to provide a road map for the researchers
and developers being interested in smart contracts.
III. SYSTEMATIZATION METHODOLOGY
Intuitively, the schemes related to smart contracts can be
divided into the construction-related and execution-related
ones, where the former focus on the design paradigms within
the current architecture, while the latter might involve modifi-
cations of the underlying execution mechanism, as discussed
in the following. We remark that the notion of constructing
and designing smart contracts are used synonymously in this
paper.
A. Designing Smart Contracts
Forms of smart contracts are various, depending on the plat-
forms they are running on. Therefore, design schemes of smart
contracts also rely on the platforms, especially the language
they support. Smart contracts written in script language are
mostly used to describe financial transactions, while in turn,
smart contracts written in Turing-complete languages could
theoretically describe any deterministic protocol as a computer
program.
Existing blockchain platforms can be categorized into two
types: one that supports only limited expressions of opera-
tions is called script-based blockchain, represented by Bitcoin,
while the other supports arbitrary operations with Turing-
complete programming languages, is called Turing-complete
blockchain, represented by Ethereum.
Since the smart contracts on these two kinds of platforms
have significant differences in terms of expression (as well as
execution), the construction schemes are also quite different.
Therefore, we will discuss the smart contract construction
schemes separately for these two kinds of platforms, i.e.,
script-based and Turing-complete blockchains. We remark that
although the forms of smart contracts are completely different,
the design concept may sometimes be migrated from one to
the other.
Additionally, the schemes in each category are further
divided into two parts: design patterns and design tools, where
the former describe some common and useful paradigms,
including paradigms for specific applications, best practices for
general purpose, etc., and the latter discuss the tools available
in the process of developing smart contracts. Some tools help
developers to confirm the contracts security to avoid economic
losses caused by potential vulnerabilities or bugs. They are
called analysis tools, and they usually take effect after the
contract is almost completed. Other tools work during the
construction process of contracts, improving the efficiency of
development, or reducing the concerns of security issues, and
they are called auxiliary tools in this paper.
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Other than the expressivity of their supported programming
language, the aforementioned two kinds of smart contract
platforms also vary in the execution mechanisms. But from
another point of view, the mainstream platforms in both
categories suffer from several common problems in terms of
transaction delay, contract complexity, privacy leakage, etc.
To solve these problems, numerous schemes are proposed.
In this paper, we divide them into three classes: 1) private
contracts with extra tools, 2) off-chain channels, and 3)
extensions on core functionalities.
Generally speaking, schemes in the first two categories
usually follow the original rules, while those in the last
category often introduce new functionalities or properties by
modifying the underlying execution mechanisms. Solutions
in the first category often introduces useful cryptographic
protocols or hardware to help protecting the user privacy
during the executions of smart contracts. We remark that
schemes in the second category are quite prevalent recently
since they do not require extra tools nor modifications of
the underlying mechanism. Their core idea is to migrate the
execution off-chain, and only use blockchain for final state
settlement or dispute handling, and we call them as off-chain
channels. Schemes in the last category are designed to add
to the functionality that the original platforms do not support,
and their application require a fork of the existing system, or
even launching a new one instead.
We classify the schemes related to smart contracts in the
literature in Table I. In the “Theory” column, the symbols
of 3, 3 and 7 show, respectively, that the work: has both
complete description and formal security proof, has description
but no proof, and has neither description nor proof. Similarly,
in the “Realization” column, the symbols of 3, 3 and 7 show,
respectively, that the work: has open-sourced implementation,
has implementation but is not open-sourced, and has no im-
plementation. The word open-sourced here means the source
code is released online and available for all users. This is of
great significance for succeeding researchers and developers
to learn from these schemes. In addition, if there are multiple
references in the same line, there will be multiple 3, 3 or 7
in the “Theory” and “Realization” columns in the same order.
IV. CONSTRUCTING SMART CONTRACTS WITH SCRIPTS
Script-based blockchains usually provide some simple
stack-based opcodes to facilitate more flexible circulation of
cryptocurrencies. For example, a payer could specify a condi-
tion under which the payee receives his payment. The primary
purpose of such script languages is to facilitate simple financial
affairs or demands. Therefore, smart contracts in script-based
blockchains are relatively simple and limited compared with
those in Turing-complete blockchains.
In this section, we discuss the construction schemes of smart
contracts in script-based blockchains. We take Bitcoin as a
representative. The reasons are as follows:
(1) Bitcoin is the first and the largest (with the most users)
script-based smart contract platform.
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Fig. 5. Usage of the OP_RETURN opcode (until Feb. 2017) [47].
(2) Most state-of-the-art script-based blockchains are derived
from Bitcoin, thereby most construction schemes in Bit-
coin could be easily applied to such blockchain systems
with slight modifications.
(3) Most relevant studies also focus on the construction of
smart contracts in Bitcoin.
We divide the schemes related to the contract construc-
tion into two categories: design paradigms and tools. Design
paradigms here refer to the patterns that are modular in
functionalities, applicable to different scenarios and widely
considered secure. Such schemes may help to efficiently
develop secure smart contracts (see Section IV-A). Design
tools here refer to the solutions that are aimed at guaranteeing
the security of smart contracts (see Section IV-B).
A. Design Paradigms
As is mentioned in Section II-A2a, most smart contracts in
Bitcoin [12] use P2SH transactions. Before the introduction
of P2SH transaction in BIP16 [187], there have already been
a few transactions realized the contract for data storage, by
modifying (or abusing) the standard ones. With the P2SH
solution, transactions are no longer restricted to ordinary
payments, i.e., it becomes possible to implement some simple
protocols in Bitcoin.
We divide the design paradigms in Bitcoin into four
parts, according to their use and applications. Firstly, several
schemes for data storage are proposed in the early years
(see Section IV-A1), taking advantage of the tamper-resistant
nature of the underlying blockchain. Secondly, based on
the storage contracts, some researchers further regard the
blockchain as a public bulletin board, and implement the
SMPC protocol (Definition 15). SMPC could be viewed as
a special form of smart contracts, as it intends to reach agree-
ments on the execution results without a trusted third party.
Related schemes focus on various features of SMPC, such
as fairness and generalization (see Section IV-A2). Thirdly,
layer-2 protocols are proposed to address the problem of
long confirmation delay and low throughput of Bitcoin. Such
protocols optimize both the money and time overhead by
moving the calculation off-chain (see Section IV-A3). Finally,
to avoid potential privacy leakage due to the public nature of
Bitcoin, the concept of scriptless contract is proposed, with
which the transaction reveals no information of the contract
contents (see Section IV-A4).
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SUMMARY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND EXECUTING SCHEMES OF SMART CONTRACTS
Class Reference* Year Keywords Theory† Realization♣
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[13] 2012 P2SH Transactions & Common Contracts 3 3
[46]–[48] 2014-2018 OP_RETURN Opcode 373 333
[49]–[51] 2014-2017 Contracts for Lottery 333 373
[52] 2015 Contracts for On-line Poker 3 7
[53] 2014 General Fair Multi-Party Protocols 3 7
[54]–[56] 2016 Secure Multi-Party Computation on Public Blockchains 333 377
[57]–[59] 2015-2018 Probabilistic Payment System 333 377
[60]–[62] 2016-2019 Scriptless Contract 333 373
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n
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s [63]–[67] 2014-2018 Security Models 33333 37333
[65]–[72] 2017-2019 Languages 33333333 33333333
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[51], [73] 2017 Contracts for Lottery 33 33
[74] 2018 Lending Contracts 3 3
[75]–[78] 2016-2020 Contracts for e-Government 3333 7773
[79], [80] 2018 Private Auction Protocol 33 33
[81]–[84] 2017-2019 Off-chain Computation and Storage 3333 7733
[14], [85], [86] 2016-2020 Best Practices on Writing Smart Contracts 333 333
[30], [87], [88] 2016-2018 Classification & Common Patterns 333 333
[32], [89]–[96] 2016-2020 Common Vulnerabilities 333333333 337773337
[97], [98] 2016 Designing Models 33 77
[99] 2016 Interfaces for Updating Smart Contracts 3 3
D
es
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n
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ol
s
[100], [101] 2017-2019 Detecting Reentrancy Vulnerabilities 33 33
[102]–[107] 2017-2019 Detecting Gas-Related Vulnerabilities 333333 337333
[108] 2018 Detecting Trace Vulnerabilities 3 3
[109] 2019 Detecting Event-Ordering Bug 3 3
[110], [111] 2018-2020 Detecting Integer Bug 33 33
[89], [112]–[120] 2016-2020 General Detection by Symbolic Execution 3333333333 3333333333
[121] 2018 General Detection by Syntax Analysis 3 3
[122]–[124] 2018 General Detection by Abstract Interpretation 333 333
[125] 2019 General Detection by Data-Flow Analysis 3 3
[126] 2018 General Detection by Topological Analysis 3 3
[127], [128] 2018 General Detection by Model Checking 33 73
[129] 2019 General Detection by Deductive Proof 3 3
[130] 2018 General Detection by Satisfiability Modulo Theories 3 7
[131]–[134] 2018-2019 General Detection by Fuzzing Test 33333 33333
[135]–[143] 2016-2019 Frameworks 333333333 737333777
[138], [144]–[150] 2016-2019 Languages 33333333 33373733
[90], [151]–[153] 2017-2019 Basic Tools 3333 7333
E
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n
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t
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ts
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iv
at
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ts
w
ith
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s [154]–[156] 2015-2018 Private Contracts with Multi-Party Computation 333 337
[6], [135], [136] 2016-2018 Private Contracts with Zero-Knowledge Proof 333 373
[155], [157]–[162] 2017-2019 Private Contracts with Trusted Execution Environment 3333333 3333333
O
ff
-c
ha
in
C
ha
nn
el
s [17], [62], [163]–[167] 2015-2019 Payment Channel Network on Bitcoin 3333333 3377733
[168]–[171] 2015-2017 Payment Channel Network on Ethereum 3333 73333
[24], [172]–[178] 2017-2019 State Channel Network 33333333 37373333
E
xt
en
si
on
on
C
or
e
Fu
nc
tio
na
lit
ie
s [179], [180] 2016-2017 Bitcoin Covenants 33 73
[181], [182] 2019-2020 Moving Contracts across Blockchains 33 33
[183] 2018 Proof-Carrying Smart Contracts 3 7
[184] 2018 Private Contracts with One-Step Proof 3 3
[185] 2018 Complex Contracts Execution without Validation 3 3
[186] 2018 Private Execution of Arbitrary Contracts 3 3
*: If there are multiple references in the same line, there will be multiple marks of 3, 3 or 7 in the “Theory” and “Realization” columns with the same order.
†: In the “Theory” column, the symbols of 3, 3 and 7 show, respectively, that the work: has both complete description and formal security proof, has
description but no proof, and has neither description nor proof.
♣: In the “Realization” column, the symbols of 3, 3 and 7 show, respectively, that the work: has open-sourced implementation, has implementation but is
not open-sourced, and has no implementation. The word open-sourced here means the source code is released online and available for all users.
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1) Data storage: The tamper-resistant property of Bitcoin
blockchain attracts some users to store short messages as
witnesses or memorandums.
The original version of Bitcoin does not support storing
data other than transactions. Some users abuse the output
field (i.e., the hash of the target address in Tx.out) in a
standard transaction by filling it with meaningful strings, such
as sentences, ASCII art [188], etc. However, the UTXOs
in such transactions will never be spent, since it is almost
impossible to solve the secret keys according to such arbitrary
strings. Therefore, such UTXOs will stay in miners’ memory
pool forever, which results in the loss of hardware capacity.
To avoid such abuse, OP_RETURN opcode [46] is intro-
duced, enabling appending additional messages in a transac-
tion. Bartoletti et al. [47] analyzed the usage of this opcode
in 2017, and we rephrase the statistical results in Fig. 5.
They conclude that at least 22 protocols adopt OP_RETURN
to provide services like asset declaration, integrity proof of
files, digital copyright, information recording, etc. Faisal et
al. [48] conducted a similar work in 2018, and they argued
that OP_RETURN may be utilized by ransomware, serving as
a certificate of payment. Their statistical results and classifi-
cations are similar to that in [47], so they are not listed here.
2) Secure multi-party computation: With the data storage
contracts discussed above, Bitcoin can be used as a public
bulletin board without a trusted third party, enabling the
implementation of SMPC (Definition 15).
Andrychowicz et al. [49] first implement a timed com-
mitment scheme in Bitcoin, where a commitment should be
opened within a specified time period, otherwise the publisher
will be penalized. They further propose a Bitcoin-based SMPC
protocol. However, the amount of deposit grows rapidly when
the number of participants increases in the multi-party case
and the fairness is not guaranteed in practice, that is, the
counterparties can abort or claim their deposits by trying
to race other transactions on-chain. Nonetheless, two lottery
schemes involving only two parties are proposed in [49]
and [50], respectively, where the former works under an unre-
alistic assumption and the latter eliminates such assumption by
strengthening the non-malleability of the Bitcoin transaction
(i.e., the ability to prevent the adversary from generating
valid transactions according to the collected transactions). As
pointed out in [50], the scheme is more general and supports
arbitrary two-party functions, but it only works in a two-party
scenario.
To alleviate the deposit-explosion problem in the multi-party
case, Bartoletti and Zunino [51] propose a multi-party lottery
contact with fixed deposits, which requires a modification
of the Bitcoin mechanism. They then implement the scheme
on Ethereum (see Section V-A1a). Kumaresan et al. [52]
consider a decentralized online poker protocol. They propose
a primitive called secure cash distribution with penalties to
guarantee the fair finalization of the poker game, which also
utilizes the timed commitment to incentivize rational players
to behave honestly. Their scheme requires some additional
opcodes in Bitcoin and thus cannot directly apply to Bitcoin.
But it provides an inspiration for the subsequent works on
general SMPC protocols.
Deposit(sid, 1λ)
Upon invocation by Ps:
Freceive,s(DEPOSIT, sid, ssid, Ps, Pr, φ, τ, v)
if (DEPOSIT, sid, ssid, Ps, Pr, ·) does not exist:
Frecord(DEPOSIT, sid, ssid, Ps, Pr, φ, τ, v) and broadcast
Claim(sid, 1λ, τ)
Upon invocation by Pr in round τ:
Freceive,r (CLAIM, sid, ssid, Ps, Pr, φ, τ, v, ω)
if (DEPOSIT, sid, ssid, Ps, Pr, φ, τ, x) exists and φ(ω) = 1:
Fbroadcast(CLAIM, sid, ssid, Ps, Pr, φ, τ, v, ω)
Fsend,r (CLAIM, sid, ssid, Ps, Pr, φ, τ, v)
Fdelete(DEPOSIT, sid, ssid, Ps, Pr, φ, τ, v)
Refund(sid, 1λ, τ)
Upon invocation by Ps or Pr in round τ + 1:
if (DEPOSIT, sid, ssid, Ps, Pr, φ, τ, v) exists:
Fsend,s(REFUND, sid, ssid, Ps, Pr, φ, τ, v)
Fdelete(DEPOSIT, sid, ssid, Ps, Pr, φ, τ, v)
Fig. 6. Ideal claim-or-refund functionality F∗CR [52]–[56].
In addition to above-mentioned SMPC for specific appli-
cations, there are some studies dedicating to general SMPC
protocols. Bentov et al. [53] introduced an ideal description
of fair multi-party protocol in Bitcoin in 2014, which is more
general and could also be applied to other script-based smart
contracts. Their results are implemented into the decentralized
online poker in [52], with the primitive called secure cash
distribution with penalties that guarantees the fair finalization
of the poker game. They also utilize the timed commitment
to incentivize rational players to behave honestly. Kumaresan
et al. [54], [55] improve the efficiency of the deposit-based
general SMPC protocol in [52]. From another aspect, Kiayias
et al. [56] further give the first fair and robust SMPC protocol
based on the blockchain.
The general SMPC protocols described above [53]–[56] use
the same ideal claim-or-refund functionality F ∗CR for secure
cash distribution. We conclude the contents of F ∗CR in Fig. 6,
where λ is the security parameter, sid and ssid are two
distinct session identifiers, and τ is the round number. A
sender Ps sends a fund of value v to a receiver Pr , and Pr
should provide a witness ω such that φ(ω) = 1 within the
τth round to claim the fund, where φ refers to the primitive
predefined by Ps . Fsend,x (resp. Freceive,x) is the ideal function
that sends (resp. receives) the message to (resp. from) Px ,
where x ∈ {s, r}. Fbroadcast, Frecord and Fdelete are the ideal
functions that broadcast, record and delete messages. With this
F ∗CR, different schemes are designed in [52]–[56] to optimize
the efficiency, fairness and robustness of SMPC.
3) Layer-2 protocols: Smart contracts written in scripts are
limited in complexity and processing rate. To overcome these
problems, layer-2 protocols are introduced. The main idea
is to separate the computation from the validation process,
that is, the executions of smart contract are performed off
the blockchain, and only necessary steps, such as setup,
recording, settlement, and dispute resolution, are carried out
on blockchain. In this way, the limitation of opcodes and
the effect of high delay can be avoided. Moreover, since
the contents of smart contracts are only visible by the off-
chain participants, the privacy of smart contracts are enhanced.
Related schemes are classified and summarized in [189] (up
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Fund Tx0
Inputs:
Bx from Alice’s UTXO
Outputs:
Bx to amul
Signature:
Alice 3
Refund Tx1 with Timelock t
Inputs:
Bx from the UTXO of Tx0
Outputs:
Bx to Alice
Signature:
Alice , Bob 3
(a) Setup
Fund Tx0
Inputs:
Bx from Alice’s UTXO
Outputs:
Bx to amul
Signature:
Alice 3
Payment Txi+1
Inputs:
Bx from the UTXO of Tx0
Outputs:
B(x −∑i δi) to Alice, B(∑i δi) to Bob
Signature:
Alice 3, Bob 
(b) The ith update of the payment (i > 1)
Fig. 7. Micropayment from Alice to Bob [13] (the time and payload field
is omitted for simplicity). In (a), Alice deposits Bx to the multi-signature
address amul in Tx0, and generates the time-locked refund transaction Tx1
with Bob’s signature according to Tx0. In (b), Alice sends Bob a signed
transaction Txi+1 (i denotes the ith update) as her payment. Bx in amul will
be divided into two parts: B(Σiδi ) for Bob and the rest for Alice, where δi
denotes the value in ith payment, and Σiδi refers the total amount to be
transferred.
to 2019), and they are divided into three types: off-chain
channel, construction schemes for off-chain network and off-
chain network management. Based on [189], we summarize
the design patterns of contracts related to the layer-2 protocol,
as described below.
Payment channel is one of the most significant components
among layer-2 protocols. It is first introduced in [13], known
as the micropayment channel, a protocol that conducts con-
tinuous micropayments to one recipient. It utilizes the multi-
signature opcode CHECKMULTISIG provided in Bitcoin, so
that to spend the UTXOs in such transactions, more than one
signature is required.
According to [13], we restate the micropayment channel
in Fig. 7, where the time and payload fields are omitted for
simplicity. Suppose a channel is established between the payer
Alice and the payee Bob. Initially, Alice creates (but does not
broadcast) Tx0 that deposits Bx to a multi-signature address
amul, which requires both signatures of Alice and Bob to spend
the UTXO. Alice then generates the refund transaction Tx1,
which returns the funds from amul to Alice. There is a timelock
t in Tx1: if Bx is not claimed in t, Alice can reclaim it freely
with her own signature. Then, Alice and Bob jointly sign
and broadcast Tx1, and Alice simultaneously broadcasts Tx0.
Hence, Alice’s Bx is locked in amul. Whenever Alice wants to
pay, she creates the transaction Txi+1 (i denotes the ith update)
and sends the signed Txi+1 to Bob. In Txi+1, the fund Bx in
amul is divided into two parts: B(∑i δi) for Bob and the rest for
Alice, where δi denotes the value in ith payment and
∑
i δi is
the total amount paid to Bob. Finally, Bob signs and broadcasts
the latest transaction, so that the payment will be finalized,
and both Alice and Bob will get what they deserve. Since the
inputs of Txi all come from the same address amul, only one
finalization will take effect, so that Bob has the incentive to
broadcast the latest payment to get the coins he deserves.
Based on the micropayment channel, the concepts of pay-
ment channel networks (PCN) and state channel networks
are derived. Their main idea and the structure of scripts (or
contract) are similar and related studies are dedicated on the
fairness of the protocol execution which is off-chain, so we
reserve the introduction of these schemes to Section VI-B1.
Probabilistic payment system is another research direction
in layer-2 protocols. It was first implemented as smart con-
tracts in [57] in 2015. The core idea is that the transactions
only succeed in a probabilistic manner. In other words, for
a fixed success probability ρ and amount Bx per transaction,
then on average, a recipient will get Bρx in every transaction.
This can be applied in lotteries and other situations involving a
large number of small payments. In such a system, senders are
required to do two deposits, one for payment and the other for
penalty. Further, the scheme in [57] requires a verifiable trusted
service (VTS) for the validation of probabilistic payments,
which makes the scheme impractical. Hu et al. [58] adopt
a time-locked deposit in Bitcoin to improve the efficiency,
which only needs one on-chain transaction to achieve the same
functionality as the original scheme in [57]. Chiesa et al. [59]
propose a concept of decentralized anonymous micropayment
(DAM). With the fractional message transfer technique that
transfers messages in a probabilistic manner, the privacy in
probabilistic payment system is better protected. But they point
out that the double-spending in their probabilistic payment
system is inevitable and analyze the effect of this attack in
their work.
Probabilistic payment system reduces the number of trans-
actions, decreases transaction fee and improves transaction
rate. We restate the probabilistic payment system [57] in
Fig. 8. Similar to that in a micropayment channel, Alice firstly
deposits the escrow Bx and penalty By to the multi-signature
addresses ae and ap, respectively. Next, Bob generates a
random number r1 and sends FSHA−256(r1) to Alice, along with
his address aB, where FSHA−256 refers to the SHA-256 hash
function. Afterwards, Alice generates the payment transaction
Tx1 and penalty transaction Tx2 in Fig. 8(a), where the zero
address a0 is used to destroy the funds. Tx1 and Tx2 are sent
to VTS after being signed. Note that there is a timelock t in
Tx1 and Tx2, similar to that in the micropayment scheme.
Next, Alice generates a random number r2, If r1 ⊕ r2 < r
holds, where r is related to the pre-agreed probability, their
message transcripts will be sent to VTS, and VTS will sign
and broadcast Tx1 if the message is correct, as is shown
in Fig. 8(b). Note that during the whole process, when Bob
and VTS receive a signature, they shall verify it before other
operations. In addition, if Alice spends the Bx before Tx1
takes effect, the VTS will sign Tx2 so that Alice’s penalty
deposit will be destroyed.
4) Scriptless contracts: The aforementioned P2SH-based
smart contracts require publishing the full scripts, which
causes the privacy concern of users. Apart from the layer-
2 protocols described above, scriptless contract is another
solution for this problem. It is similar to a standard transaction,
but achieves the same goal as smart contracts. Since there is
no script, the contents of a smart contract would never be
disclosed. It is first proposed in [60], and its original goal is
to prevent miners from rejecting packaging P2SH transactions,
because executing scripts consumes more time and space than
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Output:
By to a0
Signature:
Alice , VTS 
(a) Setup
Alice Bob VTS
1. r1 ←$ {0, 1}128
2. c← FSHA−256(r1)
3. aB ←$ UB4. c, aB
5. r2 ←$ {0, 1}8
6. σ ← FSign(ske, c, r2, a2)
7. σe ← FSign(ske,T1)
8. σp ← FSign(skp,T1)
9. r2, σ, σe, σp
10. if r2 ⊕ r2 ≥ r , abort
11. (c, r1, r2, σ, σe, ae, aB)
12. if r2 ⊕ r2 ≥ r , abort
13. sign and broadcast Tx1
(b) Payments
Fig. 8. Probabilistic payment from Alice to Bob [57]. In (a), Alice first deposits the escrow Bx and penalty By to ae and ap, respectively. Next, Alice
generates the payment Tx1 and penalty Tx2 with Bob’s address aB and a0, the zero address that is used to destroy the funds. VTS here represents verifiable
trusted service, index e and p represent escrow and penalty, respectively. In (b), Alice and Bob interact using random numbers r1, r2, private keys ske, skp ,
SHA-256 hash function FSHA−256 and signing function Fsign. Each time Bob and VTS receive a signature, they shall verify it before continuing.
standard transactions. In addition, an application instance of
selling a factorization of an RSA modulus is provided in [60],
which requires an additional opcode in Bitcoin.
Scriptless contracts are further summarized in [61], which
present a way to construct a smart contract without exposing
scripts. With Schnorr signature [190] (which is not currently
compatible with Bitcoin), it is possible to execute scripts only
among parties involved in the transaction and only the final
settlement is updated on-chain. Such transactions for scriptless
contract are indistinguishable from the standard ones, so the
privacy of contract contents is well protected. However, the
functionality of such contracts is quite limited, as the final
output should be directly verifiable in the same way as a
standard transaction.
In the subsequent work, Malavolta et al. [62] present script-
less contracts using ECDSA signature, which is compatible
in both Bitcoin and Ethereum. Their work makes scriptless
contracts more practical and applicable without requiring a
hard fork.
Some may argue that the HTLC and RSMC contracts in
Lightning Network [17] (see Section VI-B1) also include
the idea of non-public execution, but in fact, they are only
used for efficient payment, whose forms are almost fixed
and monotonous, compared to the scriptless contracts de-
scribed above. The privacy-preserving nature of such script-
less schemes makes it an appealing research direction in
blockchain.
B. Design Tools
We have described some script-based smart contracts in
the prior part, which may help developers start quickly under
similar scenarios. From another point of view, due to the lack
of readability and limitation in script operations, constructing
script-based smart contracts is a hard work. In addition, since
most smart contracts involve money transfer, a vulnerability
in a smart contract may cause severe economic loss. This
makes the security of smart contracts more critical than general
computer programs. In this section, we introduce some design
tools, which relieve the burden of smart contract developers
to some extent and help developers to build smart contracts
that meet security requirements with ease. We divide these
tools into analysis tools and languages, where the former help
validate the security of contracts, and the latter facilitate the
writing of smart contracts.
1) Analysis tools: With regard to the security analysis in
script-based smart contracts, contracts in Bitcoin are abstracted
as timed automata in [63], where the states are finite and
change chronologically. In this way, the model detection tool
UPPAAL [191] for timed automata can be used to ensure that
the contract runs as expectation.
As for the modeling of smart contracts, Bigi et al. [64]
propose an ideal model in Bitcoin and provide a security
analysis using game theory. The authors analyze the possible
behaviors executed by two parties and explain the feasibility
of their model. However, the model is limited in the two-party
case, which excludes the multi-party situation.
2) Contract languages: Considering the difficulty in script
programming, a variety of new languages for smart contracts
are proposed, aimed at improving the expressivity, readability
and verifiability of the Bitcoin scripts. These languages are
shown in Table II, where 3 denotes that the language has the
corresponding properties, while 7 means the opposite. They
can be divided into high-level languages and intermediate
expression (IR) languages according to their expressivity.
High-level languages refer to those that are more expressive
and can be directly used by ordinary developers with ease,
while IR indicates an intermediate representation that is useful
during the compilation and security analysis procedure of
smart contracts.
On the expressivity aspect of contract languages, Ivy [68] is
one of the earliest high-level languages designed for Bitcoin.
Ivy’s syntax is similar to common high-level languages, and
it adds some specialized keywords for operations in Bitcoin.
Some examples are given in its documentation [68], e.g., Lock-
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TABLE II
LANGUAGES FOR BITCOIN-RELEVANT BLOCKCHAINS
Language Year SecurityProof
Open-
Sourced
Templates
Available Description
Ivy [68] 2016 7 3 3 High-level language, educational purposes only
Simplicity [69] 2017 3 7 7 Intermediary representations, verifiable with Coq
BALZaC [67] 2018 7 3 3 High-level language, no formal proof of security
BitML [70] 2018 3 3 3 High-level language, process-algebraic language
Note: 3 denotes that the language possesses the corresponding property in the column, while 7 means the opposite.
WithPublicKey, hashed timelock contract (the core technique
in Lightning Network, see more details in Section VI-B1).
However, the security proof of Ivy itself and the compiled
scripts is lacked, so that it could only be used for educational
purposes. Atzei et al. [65], [66] propose another formal model
of contracts in Bitcoin, which is the base of the high-level
language BALZaC [67]. They also provide the corresponding
analyzer and compiler that compiles BALZaC to standard
transactions. In addition, the authors describe the existing
smart contracts with their model, including: crowdfunding,
timed commitments, micropayment channels, lotteries, etc.
BALZaC enables developers to describe transactions in Bitcoin
with concise syntax. However, it lacks security analysis.
On the verifiability aspect of smart contracts, O’Connor et
al. [69] design a low-level Intermediate Representation (IR)
language, Simplicity, which makes use of denotational seman-
tics defined in Coq [192], a popular verification tool. With Coq
and other auxiliary tools, Simplicity helps developers easily
validate the security of smart contract. Besides, the authors
claim that Simplicity also supports static analysis to analyze
the efficiency of contract execution.
There are also studies considering both expressivity and ver-
ifiability of the script language in Bitcoin. Bartoletti et al. [70]
propose a high-level language BitML, which encapsulates the
complex instructions and provides a concise and convenient
expression for smart contracts in Bitcoin. The authors also
provide a compiler that converts BitML programs into standard
Bitcoin transactions, and they prove the correctness of their
compiler, i.e., it will cause no additional error or bug while
converting. Other works [71], [72] implement some common
smart contracts in BitML, such as covenants, timed commit-
ments, etc. However, BitML language is still limited to some
extent, that is, there are contracts that could not be expressed
by BitML.
V. CONSTRUCTING SMART CONTRACTS WITH
TURING-COMPLETE LANGUAGES
To extend the limited operations in Bitcoin’s script lan-
guage, Ethereum comes out, which introduces a new virtual
machine structure to support Turing-complete programming
languages, greatly extending the application scenarios of smart
contracts. The smart contracts are executed in Ethereum
Virtual Machine in the form of EVM bytecode. In fact,
to facilitate the definition of the execution rules in smart
contracts, some high level programming languages are intro-
duced, which can be converted into bytecode by compilers,
such as Solidity [14], LLL (Lisp-Like Language) [193] and
Serpent [15], etc. Such high-level languages are featured with
high expressivity and can reduce the difficulty of writing
contracts. Among these languages, Solidity is currently the
most prevalent, and a lot of studies focus on the security of
smart contracts in it.
There are also many derivatives from Ethereum, whose ex-
ecution mechanisms are almost the same as EVM and support
Turing-complete languages. In this paper, we call such systems
Turing-complete blockchains. Similar to Bitcoin, most related
research is conducted on Ethereum and the results could be
easily transferred to its derivative systems. Therefore, we also
take Ethereum as the representative to describe the contract
construction schemes on Turing-complete blockchains and the
schemes here are divided into two parts: design paradigms
and tools, as discussed in Section V-A and Section V-B,
respectively.
A. Design Paradigms
In order to reduce errors caused during contract program-
ming, developers are suggested to refer to contract design
paradigms, which are carefully designed against common
attacks and recognized safe. We divide the related schemes
into two categories: paradigms for specific applications and
for general purposes. The former refer to the specialized
design patterns in some popular application scenarios (see
Section V-A1), and the latter describe the patterns in general
cases (see Section V-A2). We summarize and classify these
schemes according to their application scenarios in Table III.
The symbol 3 (or 7) in “Open Source” column indicates
that the implementation can (or cannot) be publicly accessed
online. When there are multiple references in a line, there will
be multiple 3 or 7, correspondingly.
1) Paradigms for specific applications: In the early stage of
smart contracts, lottery, loan, auction and data storage are the
main applications in the market. These contracts are directly
related to financial transactions, and their contents and logic
are relatively simple. Though such contracts are only designed
for the specific scenarios, they are still significant and helpful
for similar applications. Nonetheless, in recent years, smart
contracts have attracted attentions from governments, and they
may provide benefits for municipal government processes. In
the following, we will introduce five common patterns, i.e.,
lottery, loan, auction, e-government and off-chain computation
and storage.
a) Lottery: Traditional lottery schemes require a trusted
third party to receive bets from participants and distribute the
deposits afterwards. However, there exist risks of collusion and
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TABLE III
DESIGN PATTERNS FOR TURING-COMPLETE SMART CONTRACTS
References Year Category* Main Contributions Open-Sourced†
[51], [73] 2017
Specific Patterns
Multi-party lottery 33
[74] 2018 Loan contract 3
[79], [80] 2018 Private auction protocol 33
[75]–[78] 2016-2020 Smart contracts for government processes and services 7773
[81] 2017 Off-chain computation and storage 7
[14] 2016-2020
General Patterns
Official guidance and examples for Solidity 3
[85] 2016-2020 Best practices on smart contracts 3
[86] 2016-2020 Solidity library 3
[30], [87], [88] 2017-2018 Common patterns for popular applications 333
[32], [89]–[94] 2016-2020 Vulnerabilities in smart contracts 3377773
[95], [96] 2016, 2019 Programming errors found in smart contract courses 37
[97], [98] 2016 Model and schemes for contract design 77
[99] 2016 Methods for contract update and deletion following existing mechanism 3
*: Specific Patterns here mean that the scheme is limited to specific applications, and General Patterns denote that the scheme is general for the construction
of any contract (even for smart contracts in different platforms).
†: 3 (or 7) here indicates that the implementation can (or cannot) be accessed in public online. When there are multiple references in a line, there will be
multiple 3 or 7, correspondingly.
absconding for online lottery websites. Due to the anonymity
and trustless property of blockchain, coupled with the inherent
cryptocurrencies, smart contracts can replace such trusted third
parties to eliminate these risks and minimize the leakage of
privacy. Lottery thereby becomes one of the most popular
applications of smart contracts.
Several lottery contracts implemented in Bitcoin have al-
ready been mentioned above in Section IV-A2. With the
Turing-complete languages supported by Ethereum, lottery
contracts could be implemented with better performance and
less cost. As mentioned in Section IV-A2, Bartoletti and
Zunino [51] give a multi-party lottery scheme with fixed
collateral and implement it on Ethereum. Their solution comes
from a tree of two-party games to determine the final winner
among all the participants. The authors also describe a variant
that reduces the number of transactions by a set of iteration
games between adjecent players, but it cannot guarantee the
fairness of the lottery protocol. Miller and Bentov [73] put
forward another lottery scheme with zero collateral. They
adopt a similar tree of two-party games as that in [51], but
require an extra opcode to take effect in Bitcoin, and they
also implement their scheme on Ethereum.
b) Loan: Similar to the motivations in lottery, loan is
another popular application of smart contracts. However, in
loan contracts, participants often want to borrow and lend fiat
money, since the fluctuation of cryptocurrency market value
may cause undesirable loss for either one of the participants.
Moreover, loan contracts have to deal with the counter-party
risk, where a borrower may abscond with funds.
To solve the problems above, Okoye and Clark [74] de-
sign a set of loan contracts named U. gw. o with different
methodologies. These contracts ensure the safety of funds
for both borrowers and lenders. For the problem of unstable
market value, the authors adopt an oracle contract (which
provides current exchange rate with justification) to enable
the users to settle the contract with fiat currency (e.g., USD).
Moreover, methodologies such as mortgage and insurance are
also employed in their contracts, for different security concerns
of the money.
c) Auction: In addition to lottery and loan, auction con-
tracts also make full use of the anonymity and no-third-party
features of blockchain. Strain [79] is a private auction protocol,
where participants’ identities and bids are hidden. In order
to avoid using inefficient SMPC protocol, they improve the
two-party comparison mechanism [194] and verify the results
by using zero-knowledge proofs (Definition 16). Besides, a
reversible commitment mechanism is applied to ensure the
fairness when a malicious termination occurs. However, al-
though the scheme avoids directly publishing the details of
auction on-chain, it still leaks the order of bids. To solve
this problem, Galal and Youssef [80] propose a verifiable
secret auction protocol using Pederson commitment [195]
and zero-knowledge proofs, and implement their work on
Ethereum. Their scheme ensures that participants cannot learn
any information about others during the auction process, and
anyone is allowed to verify the auction results. However, a
formal security proof is lacked.
d) e-government: Blockchain and smart contracts pro-
vide convenient verififiability and remove the need of trusting
each other. Ølnes [75] argues that such advantages of smart
contracts can be used for applications other than currencies, es-
pecially for online government processes (i.e., e-government).
Ølnes et al. [76] further discuss the benefits and implications
of blockchains for e-government applications. With a similar
point of view, Hou [77] does a investigation of the blockchain
applications of e-government in China. However, all the dis-
cussions above involves no practical implementations. Most
recently, Krogsbøll et al. [78] give a prototype implementa-
tion of a governmental service in Denmark, with attractive
properties (e.g., verifiability). The authors point out that the
e-government applications are possible with smart contracts,
if taking care of the privacy issues.
e) Off-chain computation and storage: Taking smart
contracts off-chain is a promising way to avoid the side effects
of the high confirmation delay while maintaining the trustless
property offered by blockchain. With this idea, Eberhardt et
al. [81] analyze the suitable scenarios of off-chain computation
and storage, and give several design patterns for off-chain
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schemes. The typical scenarios are payment channel network
and state channel network. These solutions mainly focus on the
execution protocol, so we leave the discussion to Section VI-B.
To attain advantages (e.g., privacy, latency, transaction fees,
etc.) from both on-chain and off-chain implementations , Car-
los Molina-Jiménez et al. [82] propose a hybrid solution that
splits a smart contract into on-chain and off-chain components.
However, this comes at the cost of complex implementation
strategy, which depends on concrete applications. The authors
provide a proof-of-concept implementation of a simple trading
contract [83], to demonstrate the feasibility of their work.
Similarly, Li et al. [84] separate a smart contract into the
light/public parts and heavy/private parts, to avoid high trans-
action fees and confirmation delay caused by complex on-
chain executions. Their solution also suffers from the absence
of a general way to make such separation.
2) Paradigms for general purposes: We have described
some design paradigms for specific applications in the prior
part. From another aspect, some studies are trying to give a
general pattern that applies to the design of all kinds of smart
contracts. Some of them give out the so-called “best practices”
that are aimed at mitigating common bugs and security risks
during developing. Some classify smart contracts according
to application scenarios and give patterns for each category,
which are referred as “classification and patterns of common
contracts” in this paper. Some researchers focus on common
errors in the contract construction process, as counterexamples
for beginners to learn from, and we call them “common
vulnerabilities and errors”. Finally, there are also “contract
design models” describing the experience and methods for
contract construction, from a higher perspective.
a) Best practices: It is recommended to refer to some
best practices given by researchers or communities, to avoid
vulnerabilities as much as possible. The Solidity docu-
ment [14] serves as an official guidance for writing smart
contracts, which provides tips, requirements, and some exam-
ples about contract construction. It is considered as a must-
read document for beginners, because it has been verified
and reviewed by most developers, and is being continuously
improved and updated. Besides, Consensys Diligence [85] and
OpenZeppelin [86] also provide rich open-sourced lists of best
practices and libraries.
b) Classification and patterns of common contracts:
Statistics and classification of existing contracts could help
developers find their resired reference patterns for their target
application scenarios, and further avoid contract vulnerabilities
that may commonly occur in certain applications.
In terms of classification, Bartoletti et al. [30] firstly classify
the application scenarios of smart contracts, and then list sev-
eral common contract modes, including: token, authentication,
oracle, randomness, poll, time constraint, termination, math,
and fork check, etc. Their classification covers most smart
contracts, and the numeric results are shown in Fig. 9 [30],
which illustrates the number of transactions for different types
of smart contracts on Bitcoin and Ethereum.
For the security of smart contracts, Wöhrer et al. [87], [88]
give several contract patterns according to some known secure
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Fig. 9. Distribution of the number of transactions involving different types
of smart contracts in Bitcoin and Ethereum (until Jan. 2017) [32].
contracts from the perspectives of access control, authentica-
tion, contract life cycle [196] and contract maintenance.
c) Common vulnerabilities and errors: Statistics and
classification of common vulnerabilities and errors during
contract construction may serve as counterexamples, and help
developers form a good contract pattern.
In terms of common vulnerabilities, Luu et al. [89] are the
first to summarize the security problems that commonly occur
in smart contracts. These problems are categorized into four
types, namely, transactions-ordering dependence, timestamp
dependence, mishandled exceptions and re-entrancy vulnera-
bility. The first three concepts are relatively easy to understand
from their name, and the last one refers to a concept unique
in the smart contract field. We leave the introduction of re-
entrancy in Section V-B1 where the analysis tools especially
designed for such vulnerability are discussed.
Later, Atzei et al. [32] also summarize the vulnerabilities on
smart contracts and divide them into different layers, according
to the effects of attacks, e.g., affecting the correctness of
execution, or disturbing the underlying execution mechanism.
The latest work of Groce et al. [94] makes a classification
of 246 defects found in 23 Ethereum smart contracts. They
utilize several open-sourced analysis tools (i.e., Slither [125],
Manticore [115] and Echidna [134], see Section V-B1) along
with manual auditing, and they find that there are 10 defects
per contract on average.
In addition to common vulnerabilities, there are studies
on the security properties that smart contracts should satisfy.
Following the work of [89] and [32], Grishchenko et al. [90]
conclude four security features that smart contracts should
meet. The smart contracts with such features could automat-
ically avoid some known vulnerabilities. Their classification
is useful for subsequent development and contributes to the
design of related vulnerability detection tools.
We integrate the results above in Table IV. The blanks in
the table indicate that the corresponding vulnerabilities are
not discussed in these papers. We remark that the authors
of [91] and [92] respectively do a similar work that provide
a taxonomy of the security issues according to the literature,
and give the severity level of each vulnerability.
With regard to common errors, Delmolino et al. [95] elab-
orate some common problems found in their courses about
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TABLE IV
THE POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES IN SMART CONTRACTS ON
ETHEREUM [32], [89], [90]
Level [32] Causes [32], [89] Security [90] Attacks [32], [89]
Solidity
Call to the unknown Call Integrity The DAO attack
Reentrancy
Gasless send – King of the Ether Throne
Exception disorders Atomicity King of the Ether Throne& GovernMental
Type casts – –
Keeping secrets – Multi-player games
EVM
Immutable bugs – Rubixi& GovernMental
Ether lost in trasfer – –
Stack size limit – GovernMental
Blockchain
Unpredictable state Independence of
mutable account
state
GovernMental
& Dynamic libraries
Transaction ordering dependence Run
Generating randomness Independence
of transaction
environment
–
Time constraints GovernMental
smart contracts construction. Although they adopt Serpent [15]
as the programming language, many problems reflected are
universal for all languages when designing smart contracts.
The authors summarize four types of errors, including: design
errors on state machines, absence of cryptographic protocols,
unreasonable incentive mechanisms, and vulnerabilities caused
by Ethereum itself. These errors are of educational meaning
for all developers, especially the beginners. Angelo et al. [96]
also give a summary on their smart contract course, but they
start from the perspective of a teacher, and focus more on the
teaching process, rather than the design skills.
From a practical perspective, Pérez and Livshits [93] ex-
plore 6 frequently mentioned vulnerabilities in Ethereum, and
find that the actual exploitation of these vulnerabilities are
relatively rare: the hacked amounts of ETH only takes up to
0.27% of the total ETH marked as vulnerable by analysis tools
(see Section V-B1). The authors explain that this is because
most vulnerable ETH is held by several contracts that are
not exploitable in practice (i.e., the exploitation requires a
malicious majority).
d) Design models: From a higher perspective, some
researchers put forward several design models for smart con-
tracts. Clack et al. [97], [98] firstly discuss the basis, design
method and research direction of smart contract templates, and
then discuss the basic requirements of smart legal contracts,
which refer to the contracts serving for legal purposes. They
also propose a design model for the storage and release of
contracts from a higher level. Marino et al. [99] summarize
the available methods of contract modification and deletion
without modifying the existing execution mechanism. They
often require developers to reserve some interfaces at the
beginning, and it is a good practice to consider such future
updating demands.
B. Design Tools
Design tools discussed here are used to help developers
in building smart contracts more efficiently, and they usually
come in the form of useful software rather than boring instruc-
tions. They may reduce the security concerns of developers or
simplify the development process in an intuitive or interactive
way. We further divide the existing design tools into analysis
tools and auxiliary tools in this paper. Analysis tools are
used to perform security analysis when the contracts are
almost completed, and to find potential vulnerabilities (see
Section V-B1). On the other hand, auxiliary tools usually take
effect in the process of contract developing, facilitating the
development to some extent (see Section V-B2).
Prior to our work, there have been several studies con-
ducting a survey on the contract design tools. Dika [33]
conducted a detailed comparison of the analysis tools in 2017,
from the aspects of the efficiency, accuracy, and types of
supported vulnerabilities. Harz et al. [35] further analyzed the
related languages and security tools in 2018. They make a
brief introduction and classification of these languages and
tools. Later on, Grishchenko et al. [122], [123], Angelo and
Salzer [38], Liu and Liu [39] make a review on the smart-
contract-related security tools, from several different aspects,
respectively.
Based on the discussions above, we summarize, compare
and analyze the existing (up to August 2020) contract lan-
guages and vulnerability detection tools in detail. Our work on
the contract design tools can be viewed as a further extension
to the surveys mentioned above.
1) Analysis tools: A smart contract is a piece of executable
computer program deployed on a blockchain. So, traditional
code analysis methods can be naturally extended to the field
of security analysis. Since there are many vulnerabilities
unique in smart contracts, many tools are specifically designed
for these threats. Some of them focus on detecting certain
kinds of vulnerabilities that frequently appear and may cause
severe consequences. Others are aimed at general security
analysis, which could simultaneously detect multiple potential
vulnerabilities, or even user-defined properties of the smart
contracts, and remind the developers of potential risks. The
former tools usually work with higher accuracy and can help
to mitigate the pressure caused by some specific attacks. The
latter remind developers of the vulnerabilities and risks that
are overlooked during development.
According to the type and number of vulnerabilities that
the analysis tools detect, we divide them into 6 classes in
this paper: (a) re-entrancy attacks related; (b) gas consumption
related; (c) trace vulnerability related; (d) event-ordering bugs
related; (e) integer bugs related; and (f ) general detection
tools. The first five classes of tools are all focused on some
specific vulnerabilities, while the last type of tools achieve
general detection of vulnerabilities. In addition, we further
categorize the general detection tools by the technologies that
they utilize, including symbolic execution, syntax analysis,
abstract interpretation, data-flow analysis, topological analysis,
model checking, deductive proof, satisfiability modulo theories
and fuzzing test.
The analysis tools we discuss are listed in Table V. There
are also some specially designed languages called Domain
Specific Languages (DSL), which are used to support user-
defined conditions in the process of security analysis. Such
languages are not included in Table V, because they usually
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come along with their corresponding tools. Moreover, contents
in the column “Input” represent the form of smart contracts
(e.g., Solidity or EVM bytecode) that the tool accepts as input.
The symbol of 3 in the column “Open-sourced” means that
the source code of the tool can be referenced online, while 7
means the opposite.
a) Re-entrancy attacks related: It is the re-entrancy
attack that makes users suffer huge economic losses in the
infamous DAO event [10]. In a re-entrancy attack, an attacker
utilizes the fallback function in Ethereum smart contracts,
to steal money from the smart contracts that are designed
in a nonstandard manner. The fallback function stands for
a predefined function that has no name or parameter. It is
used to handle exceptional requests, such as calling a function
that does not exist. Ideally, when a contract CA calls a
function in another contract CB, it waits until the executed
function is completely finished, before getting back to the
remaining part of CA. However, in some cases (e.g., when the
invoked function is “call”, which is used to transfer money
in Ethereum), after the invoked function is finished, the EVM
would invoke the fallback function in CB, before returning to
CA. If CB calls the contract CA in the fallback function, then
it comes to a situation of recursive invocation. When the latter
invocation starts, the former is not finished, and thus contract
CB re-enters CA. Such a re-entrancy is undesirable and may
cause unexpected consequences.
Researchers have proposed various analysis tools to de-
fend against such attacks, based on different methods and
aspects. Grossman et al. [100] propose the concept of Effective
Callback Freedom, which requires that the invocation of the
callback (i.e., fallback) function should not affect the states or
behaviors of the original program. The authors claim that this
concept can be effectively used to detect re-entrancy attacks in
Ethereum, and they integrate their idea into the online detector
named ECFChecker.
ReGuard [131] is another tool for detecting re-entrancy
vulnerabilities, utilizing fuzzing test (see Section V-B1f).
ReGuard accepts Solidity or EVM bytecode as input. It first
parses the input into the Intermediate Representation (IR),
and subsequently converts the IR into a C++ contract. Then
the fuzzing engine is employed to generate random inputs.
Finally, based on the fuzzing test results and the re-entrancy
automaton model proposed by the authors, the final result of
the vulnerability detection is generated.
From the perspective of sustainability, Michael et al. [101]
point out that existing tools could only be used to detect po-
tential vulnerabilities before the smart contracts are deployed.
That is to say, deployed contracts are protected from attacks.
To solve this problem, they propose the Sereum scheme, which
extends EVM by introducing the method of taint tracking
and an attack detector. Sereum monitors the EVM bytecode
instructions at runtime, and utilizes a write-lock mechanism
which locks the states when calling outside functions. This
mechanism fundamentally prevents the re-entrancy attack from
the underlying execution layer.
b) Gas consumption related: To prevent DoS attacks,
Ethereum introduces the gas mechanism to limit the num-
ber of operations in a contract. However, this may cause
Tools for gas consumption optimization
GASPER [102]
GasReducer [103]
– [104]
MadMax [105]
Vandal [124]
GASTAP [106]
GASOL [107]
OYENTE [89]
ETHIR [112]
Fig. 10. Relationships among tools for gas consumption optimization.
new problems. For instance, it increases the economic cost
of users since the gas should be paid in advance for the
contract execution. There are several tools for optimizing the
gas consumption, with various methods and techniques. We
summarize the relationship among these tools in Fig. 10, where
the arrows between tools refer to the dependency, and the gray
names refer to the tools that are not specifically designed for
gas consumption.
Chen et al. [102] point out that non-standard design of
smart contracts may lead to unnecessary cost of gas. By
collecting and analyzing smart contracts on Ethereum, the
authors enumerate 7 patterns that may cost more gas than
expected. They further develop an analysis tool GASPER based
on symbolic execution (see Section V-B1f). GASPER accepts
EVM bytecode as input and detects three kinds of abuse
patterns. The subsequent work [103] further lists a total of
24 gas abuse modes and develops a tool named GasReducer.
The input that GasReducer accepts is also EVM bytecode.
After code disassembling and pattern matching, it recognizes
all the 24 abuse patterns. Moreover, it automatically replaces
the costly operations with cheaper instructions that accomplish
the same functionality. In addition, by recalculation and veri-
fication of the optimized codes, GasReducer ensures that the
outcome contract still works as expected.
Similar to [102], Marescotti et al. [104] propose two algo-
rithms for calculating the maximum amount of gas that may be
consumed by smart contracts, where the latter can be seen as a
simplified version of the former. These two algorithms also use
the symbolic execution method as GASPER. But differently, by
assuming that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the EVM and Solidity gas consumption path, both algorithms
can directly analyze the contracts written in Solidity. However,
their solution only helps to calculate the statistics of gas
consumption, but does not provide optimization suggestions.
Grech et al. [105] also analyze the gas consumption problem
in Ethereum and propose an analysis tool MadMax based on
the decompilation technology and logic-driven model offered
by Vandal (see Section V-B1f). MadMax decompiles EVM
bytecode into a Control-Flow Graph (CFG), and then uses
a logic-based specification to further detect the predefined
gas-related vulnerabilities. In addition, the authors give some
suggestions for developers who write smart contracts with
high-level languages, which is not accomplished in [104].
By improving and integrating some existing tools, Albert et
al. [106] propose GASTAP. First, they improve the OYENTE
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TABLE V
ANALYSIS TOOLS FOR SMART CONTRACTS
Targets* Ref. Year Tool† Main Methods Input♣ Open-Sourced4
Re-Rntrancy
Attacks-Related
[100] 2017 ECFChecker Modular Reasoning Solidity 3
[101] 2019 Sereum Taint Tracking EVM bytecode 7
Gas-Related
[102] 2017 GASPER Symbolic Execution EVM bytecode 7
[103] 2018 GasReducer Pattern-Matching EVM bytecode 7
[104] 2018 – Symbolic Execution Solidity 7
[105] 2018 MadMax Decompiling &Logic-based Specification EVM bytecode 3
[106] 2019 GASTAP Symbolic Execution Solidity,EVM bytecode 7
[107] 2019 GASOL Symbolic Execution Solidity 7
Trace
Vulnerability [108] 2018 MAIAN Symbolic Execution EVM bytecode 3
Event-Ordering
Bugs [109] 2019 ETHERRACER
Symbolic Execution &
Fuzzing EVM bytecode 7
Integer
Bugs
[110] 2018 OSIRIS Symbolic Execution &Taint Analysis
Solidity,
EVM bytecode 3
[111] 2020 VERISMART CEGIS-style Verification Solidity 3
G
en
er
al
-p
ur
po
se
Symbolic
Execution
[89] 2016 OYENTE Symbolic Execution EVM bytecode 3
[112] 2018 ETHIR Symbolic Execution EVM bytecode 3
[113] 2019 SAFEVM Symbolic Execution Solidity,EVM bytecode 3
[114] 2018 Mythril
Symbolic Execution &
SMT solving &
Taint Analysis
EVM bytecode 3
[115] 2019 Manticore Symbolic Execution Solidity 3
[116] 2018 TEETHER Symbolic Execution &Constraint solving EVM bytecode 3
[117] 2019 sCompile Symbolic Execution EVM bytecode 7
[118] 2019 SMARTSCOPY Summary-basedSymbolic Evaluation ABI 7
[119] 2018 SECURIFY Abstract Interpretation &Symbolic Execution
Solidity,
EVM bytecode 3
[120] 2020 VERX Symbolic Execution &Abstract Solidity 7
∼ [121] 2018 SmartCheck Syntax Analysis Solidity 3
Abstract
Interpretation
[122], [123] 2018 EtherTrust Abstract Interpretation EVM bytecode 33
[124] 2018 Vandal Abstract InterpretationLogic-driven Analysis EVM bytecode 3
∼ [125] 2019 Slither Dataflow Analysis &Taint Tracking Solidity 3
∼ [126] 2018 SASC
Topological Analysis&
Syntax Analysis &
Symbolic Execution
Solidity 7
Model
Checking
[127] 2018 – Model-Checking Solidity 7
[128] 2018 ZEUS Abstract Interpretation &Symbolic Model Checking
High-level
languages 7
∼ [129] 2019 – Deductive Proof Why3 [197] 3
∼ [130] 2018 – SMT-solver Solidity 7
Fuzzing
[131] 2018 ReGuard Fuzzing Solidity,EVM bytecode 7
[132] 2018 ContractFuzzer Fuzzing ABI,EVM bytecode 3
[133] 2019 ILF Fuzzing Solidity 3
[134] 2020 Echidna Fuzzing Solidity, Vyper [198] 3
*: ∼ means that the taxon is trivial for a single object.
†: If the corresponding tool has no name, then the blank is filled with –.
♣: The input only refers to the form of smart contracts, so the analysis specification required in some tools is not included.
4: 3 here means that the corresponding tool is open-sourced and can be referenced online, while 7 means the opposite.
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tool (see Section V-B1f) to generate a CFG with more in-
formation. Then they improve the ETHERIR tool [112] (see
Section V-B1f) so that it can convert the CFG into a rule-
based representation. Based on these two improvements, along
with other auxiliary tools for calculation, GASTAP finally gets
the upper bound of gas consumption of each function in the
contract, as is done in [104]. The GASOL [107] tool further
extends GASTAP to provide suggestions to optimize the gas
consumption.
c) Trace vulnerability: As Nikolic´ et al. [108] point out,
most existing tools for security analysis only focus on a single
call of a contract, but ignore the problems that may occur
when it is called multiple times. For the latter case, they find a
new type of vulnerability named trace vulnerability. Contracts
containing such vulnerabilities may: 1) be destroyed by any
user; 2) be unable to withdraw funds; 3) transfer funds to any
address. To fix this problem, the authors propose the MAIAN
tool based on symbolic execution. MAIAN accepts EVM
bytecode as input along with user-defined analysis targets, and
it confirms the existence of trace vulnerabilities after symbolic
execution.
d) Event-ordering bugs: Event-ordering bugs evolve
from the transaction ordering dependence described in [89],
where the original concept describes the case when the order of
transactions influences the final states in the contracts. Kolluri
et al. [109] define the notion of event-ordering bug, that is,
when users call the same function in the contract, the order
of calling may lead to inconsistent results among the miners,
some of which may be undesirable. To eliminate such risks,
the authors combine the methods of symbol execution and
fuzzing test, and propose the ETHERRACER tool, which di-
rectly works on EVM bytecode. To get better performance and
accuracy, some optimizations are made to avoid the problem of
resource-explosion during symbolic execution. With fuzzing
test, ETHERRACER directly provides a counter-example to
intuitively explain the existence of the bugs, that is, two sets
of inputs of different orders that result in distinct outputs.
e) Integer bugs: Integer bugs refer to the bugs that
are related to integer arithmetic in smart contracts. Torres et
al. [110] firstly sort the integer bugs in smart contracts into:
1) arithmetic bugs that include integer overflow, underflow,
and divided by zero, etc; 2) truncation bugs that occur when
converting longer integers into shorter ones; 3) sign-related
bugs that occur during the conversion between signed and
unsigned integers. Then they propose the OSIRIS tool for these
integer bugs, based on symbolic execution and stain analysis
methods. OSIRIS accepts Solidity or EVM bytecode as input.
Compared with ZEUS [128] and other general tools that detect
multiple vulnerabilities (see Section V-B1f), OSIRIS could
detect more integer bugs with the same data set and has a lower
false positive rate. Torres et al. point out that ZEUS could not
detect integer bugs, so the claimed zero false negative is not
accurate.
Based on the works above, VERISMART [111] further im-
proves the accuracy and efficiency of the integer bug detection.
The authors point out that arithmetic-related vulnerabilities
account for more than 90% of the reported vulnerabilities.
In addition, existing tools usually come with inevitable false
positive or false negative reports, making manual checks
necessary. To address these two problems, the authors develop
the VERISMART tool that detect all known arithmetic bugs
with almost negligible false alarms. VERISMART accepts
contracts written in Solidity as input. It draws on the idea
of the counter example-guided inductive synthesis (CEGIS)
framework [199], by constantly searching candidate invariants
to check whether the contract meets security requirements.
VERISMART manages to avoid expensive operations through
a well-designed decision procedure, which helps to improve
the scalability of the tool as well. Further, it is claimed that
with appropriate improvements, VERISMART can be used to
detect other vulnerabilities.
f) General analysis: Apart from the tools that are specif-
ically designed to detect some specific vulnerabilities, many
tools are designed to detect multiple kinds of vulnerabilities
at once. We classify these general detection tools according to
the main technique they adopt, including: symbolic execution,
syntax analysis, abstract interpretation, data-flow analysis,
topological analysis, model checking, deductive proof, sat-
isfiability modulo theories solving, and fuzzing test. Among
them, symbolic execution, as the mainstream technology used
in software analysis, also occupies a dominant position in
the research of security analysis tools of smart contracts.
According to our observation, the technique of fuzzing test is
attracting more attention for contract analyzing recently. These
tools are introduced in terms of the main technique they adopt,
as follows.
i. Symbolic execution
Symbolic execution is a commonly used method to analyze
the security of computer programs. Informally, it uses sym-
bolic values to find out the value or range of the inputs that
triggers the execution of each part of the program, and then
helps to determine whether the program works according to
the developer’s expectation.
On the one hand, symbolic execution has higher accuracy
compared with other methods such as taint tracking or data-
flow analysis. On the other hand, the consumption of memory
grows rapidly as the size of target program grows, and this is
called memory explosion. Related research mainly focuses on
the accuracy rate, operation efficiency and calculation cost in
the process of analysis.
OYENTE [89] is the first symbolic-execution-based tool for
smart contract validation. It detects four types of vulnerabili-
ties categorized by the authors. The input of OYENTE is EVM
bytecode. OYENTE is improved in [112] so that the results
can be used to generate control flow graphs (CFG), and it is
the basis of the ETHIR [112] tool. The CFG generated by
ETHIR contains both control-flow and data-flow information
of the input EVM bytecode. In addition, ETHIR also generates
the corresponding rule-based representation (RBR) for further
code analysis basis. Utilizing OYENTE and ETHIR, Albert et
al. [113] design the tool SAFEVM. It employs the above tools
to convert the Solidity program or EVM bytecode into RBR,
and further converts it into a special C program [200]. After
that, existing analysis tools are applied to verify the security
of the converted C program.
Mueller [114] combines symbolic execution with other tech-
20
nologies such as SMT-solver and taint analysis, and proposes
the analysis tool Mythril [201], which works with a symbolic
execution backend LASER-Ethereum [202]. Mythril accepts
EVM bytecode as input. Compared with OYENTE, it has better
supports from the community, and is under constant opti-
mization. By the time of writing (August 2020), Mythril has
evolved into a security analysis tool supporting smart contracts
on various platforms that are derived from Ethereum, and can
be used to analyze various common bugs and vulnerabilities.
Manticore [115] is another widely used and flexible analysis
tool based on symbolic execution and satisfiability modulo
theories. It supports user-defined analysis by providing several
API for the access of the core engine. Moreover, it is able to
infer concrete inputs for a given program state, and it supports
various computer programs in traditional environments (e.g.
x86, ARM, WASM) other than Ethereum.
As mentioned before, symbolic execution only works well
to analyze short contracts due to the efficiency issues (i.e., the
memory explosion problem). Krupp and Rossow [116] opti-
mize the procedure of symbol execution with the help of CFG.
They propose TEETHER, focusing on the automatic detection
and utilization of vulnerabilities in smart contracts. Accord-
ing to the EVM bytecode input, TEETHER first generates a
CFG and sorts the critical paths related to the fund transfer.
Then, by constraint solving, the results of symbolic execution
are used to enumerate possible attacks against these critical
paths. In this way, TEETHER provides the witness of detected
vulnerabilities, while making the detection more automated.
Chang et al. [117] adopt a similar idea of partial analysis, and
propose the tool sCompile, which only works on the critical
part of a smart contract involving fund transfer. Given the
EVM bytecode, sCompile first generates the corresponding
CFG and then analyzes whether the transfer-related path meets
the predefined security properties. Paths are ranked according
to the results and some predefined rules. After that, sCompile
performs the symbolic execution on the higher-ranked paths
and finally generates an analysis report. This partial analysis
solution improves the scalability of symbolic execution.
To solve the same scalability problem, Feng et al. [118]
propose the idea of summary-based symbolic evaluation and
the corresponding tool SMARTSCOPY. SMARTSCOPY not only
supports analyzing large contracts efficiently, but also gener-
ates counterexample attacks for the detected vulnerabilities. In
order to reduce the space and time overhead for large contracts,
SMARTSCOPY symbolically evaluates the methods indicated
by the Application Binary Interface (ABI) [203] of contracts,
and summarizes the impact of each method on the blockchain.
It then conducts the range splitting and pruning procedure,
and finally the symbolic execution. The authors argue that
SMARTSCOPY can detect the newly-defined BatchOverflow
bugs that other tools previously overlooked.
In the aforementioned solutions for scaling symbolic ex-
ecution [116]–[118], some less important paths are skipped
or ignored during the analysis. Although this improves the
efficiency, but it may lead to false negative results. Tsankov et
al. [119] propose an analysis tool SECURIFY which combines
the method of abstract interpretation with symbolic execution.
SECURIFY guarantees to traverse all possible paths in a
contract, thereby reducing the false negative results caused
by the incomplete symbolic execution. Its input is EVM
bytecode, along with a security model defined by a domain
specific language. Through steps of decompiling, semantic
fact inferring, and security pattern checking, it determines
whether a contract meets the predefined properties in the
security model. Moreover, the security models in SECURIFY
are apart from the analysis tool itself, therefore, by optimizing
the security model, the accuracy of vulnerability detection
could be further raised.
From another point of view, to improve the efficiency of
analysis, VERX [120] adopts the concept of delayed predicate
abstraction. Its main idea is to combine the methods of sym-
bolic execution and abstraction together: symbolic execution
is used in the individual execution of transactions, while
abstraction is conducted between transactions. The delayed
abstract process reduces the infinite state space brought by
unlimited transactions to a limited space. VERX takes smart
contracts written in Solidity as input, along with the security
requirement, and it outputs the predicate whether the contract
meets the given properties.
ii. Syntactical analysis
Syntactical analysis is a method to analyze computer pro-
grams by parsing them into a tree and analyzing the relation
of each component.
Tikhomirov et al. [121] first summarize some potential
problems in the smart contract programming process, includ-
ing: 1) security-related issues; 2) function-related issues; 3)
execution-related issues; 4) development-related issues. They
design a static analysis tool SmartCheck that can find such
problems. SmartCheck converts the Solidity source code into
an XML parse tree [204], and then uses XPath queries [205]
to find the matched patterns. As the authors point out,
SmartCheck can not guarantee the accuracy or work without
manual check. Still, this method provides an efficient way to
detect potential vulnerabilities.
iii. Abstract interpretation
The basic idea of abstract interpretation is to verify whether
a program meets certain specific properties according to the
approximation of the semantics of the program. Related re-
search mainly focuses on the usability and accessibility of the
tool, and abstract interpretation in these studies usually comes
with some other tools, such as Horne-clause resolution, control
flow graph, etc.
Based on the work of [90] which defines the full semantics
of EVM bytecode, Grishchenko et al. [122] propose the tool
EtherTrust. It first abstracts the EVM bytecode as a series of
Horn clauses, and then uses the resolution of such clauses to
verify the reachability of the contract. The authors also give
the security analysis on the reliability of this tool. Moreover,
the authors clarify the mechanism and details of EtherTrust in
their later work [123].
Vandal [124] is an analysis framework with the idea of
abstract interpretation. It creatively converts the input EVM
bytecode into a logical relationship, and then uses the logic-
driven methods to verify the correctness and security of such a
logical relationship. Using this framework, users could easily
define security requirements and conduct security analysis.
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Brent et al. [124] also compare the performance of Vandal with
aforementioned OYENTE [89] and Mythril [201]. They show
that Vandal and Mythril find more types of vulnerabilities than
OYENTE, and Valdal is the most efficient among these three.
Based on the Vandal framework, Grech et al. [105] further
propose the Madmax tool to find gas-related vulnerabilities in
Ethereum contracts.
iv. Data-flow analysis
In data flow analysis, the runtime information of the vari-
ables is collected to check whether a program meets the
expected property during the execution. Slither [125] is an
analysis tool based on this method. It can automatically
detect vulnerabilities and help developers to have a better
understanding of smart contracts. Slither converts a Solidity
contract to the corresponding control flow graph and com-
piles it to an intermediate representation SlithIR, which is
also specified in [125]. Utilizing data-flow analysis and taint
tracking technologies, the tool can analyze large contracts that
are infeasible for symbolic execution.
v. Topological analysis
Topological analysis for smart contracts is mainly based
on the topological structure graphs that illustrate the relations
among multiple interrelated smart contracts. Taking use of the
Solidity-parser [206], Zhou et al. [126] analyze the calling
and dependency relationships in and between contracts, based
on the Solidity source code. They propose a method to form
a topological graph for developers that helps to analyze the
structure of their contracts. In addition, this method also uses
symbolic execution, syntax analysis and other methods to find
potential logical vulnerabilities in a contract.
vi. Model checking
Model Checking is a method that verifies whether a system
meets certain properties by modeling it into a finite state
machine. Regarding the security analysis of smart contracts,
related studies mainly focus on model construction, accuracy
and efficiency.
On model construction, Nehai et al. [127] propose a model-
checking-based solution to check the security of contracts.
They build a three-layer model for the smart contracts on
Ethereum, namely, the core layer, application layer and envi-
ronment layer. In the application layer, they propose a method
that compiles the Solidity source code into the NuSMV
language [207], which is model-checking friendly. Then, they
perform model checking on the compiled program to deter-
mine whether the contract meets the user-defined security
properties.
On the aspect of accuracy and efficiency, Kalra et al. [128]
combine the methods of abstract interpretation, symbolic
model checking and constrained horn clauses (CHCs), and
propose the ZEUS tool. They claim that the tool achieves zero
false negative results, with lower false positive rate compared
with tools like OYENTE. In addition, ZEUS works faster
than OYENTE. Theoretically, ZEUS accepts smart contracts
written in various high-level languages as input, and thereby
can be extended to support platforms other than Ethereum,
such as Hyperledger Fabric [7]. It converts a smart contract
into an intermediate representation by a specially-designed
compiler and inserts some check points into the intermediate
representation according to user-defined rules. Finally, with
CHCs-based verification tools, ZEUS verifies the security of
the smart contract (Definition 13).
vii. Deductive proof
The aforementioned model checking only works on small-
scale contracts, as the states in the model grow with the
contract size. Nehai and Bobot [129] propose a deductive
proof method, where they compile the Solidity contracts into
programs in Why3 language [197]. They then use the Hall-
Logic-based detection tools brought by Why3 to analyze the
properties of a contract. They also provide a compiler that
compiles the contracts written in Why3 into EVM bytecode,
so that developers can directly write contracts in Why3.
viii. Satisfiability modulo theories
Satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) involve a formula
where the parameters are functions or predicate symbols, and
the goal of SMT is to determine the satisfiability of this
formula. It usually comes with other methods, serving as an
auxiliary method. However, some studies have used it as the
main technology to complete the security analysis of smart
contracts. Alt and Reitwiessner [130] assert that SMT can be
directly integrated into the Solidity compiler to enable users
to conduct security analysis while compiling, and meanwhile
provide counterexamples to the vulnerabilities. However, the
authors only provide the idea and some use cases, but not
provide a complete plan nor an implementation of this idea.
viv. Fuzzing test
Fuzzing test is a prevalent technique for bug detection in
recent years. The core idea is to generate random data as input,
and monitor the abnormal behaviors of the target program
under these inputs. A large number of random inputs are used.
Bugs that are unreachable in normal cases could be found
by random collision in this way. Existing research on smart
contract analyzing mainly focuses on the completeness and
efficiency of the analyzing process.
ContractFuzzer [132] is the typical example that is based on
fuzzing test to detect multiple types of vulnerabilities in smart
contracts. It first generates the random inputs according to the
Application Binary Interface (ABI) of a smart contract, and
then records the execution results of these inputs. Afterwards,
it performs security analysis with predefined test oracles
which describe the characteristics of specific vulnerabilities.
Evaluation results show that ContractFuzzer has a lower false
positive rate than OYENTE, but a higher false negative rate
under certain circumstances.
Regarding the completeness and efficiency of fuzzing test,
He et al. [133] argue that tools like ContractFuzzer [132] could
not reach some paths in depth, thereby failing to find related
vulnerabilities (i.e., causes false negative results). While on the
other hand, tools based on symbolic execution can reach deep
paths, but they consume enormous resources. Combining these
two methods, the authors propose the concept of Imitation
Learning based Fuzzer (ILF). ILF learns the procedure of
the symbolic-execution-based tools, imitating the behavior
of symbolic execution paradigm. After that, the test set is
generated for the Solidity contract. In this way, fuzzing test
can be used to find more vulnerabilities efficiently.
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To support user-defined analysis, the tool Echidna [134] is
proposed. It can be used to check user-defined properties and
assertions, and it further provides an estimation of worst-case
gas consumption for the contracts. Echidna accepts contracts
written in Solidity and Vyper [198], and has been used in the
auditing service in [94].
2) Auxiliary tools: Apart from the analysis tools discussed
above, there are many other tools for auxiliary purposes, such
as frameworks, languages, and basic tools. The “framework”
refers to a set of tools or schemes that simplify or facilitate
the development of smart contracts. “Language” indicates the
new smart contract languages, such as high-level languages
with high expressivity (e.g., Solidity), and intermediate repre-
sentation (IR) that is used during the process of compilation
or analysis. “Basic tool” refers to the basic tool for other high-
level tools (e.g., the analysis tools discussed in Section V-B1,
and the high-level languages and frameworks in Section V-B2a
and Section V-B2b), such studies are much more fundamental,
and could not be applied to the construction of smart contracts
directly.
The auxiliary tools discussed in this paper are summarized
in Table VI, where the 3 (resp. 7) in the “Open-sourced”
column represents that the corresponding tool is open-sourced
(resp. not). When there are multiple references in the same
line, there will be multiple 3 or 7 in the same order.
a) Frameworks: Frameworks refer to the auxiliary tools
available to developers during the contract construction pro-
cess, simplifying the development of smart contracts. Some
of them help developers to achieve the privacy goal of the
contract, or to analyze the security properties of a contract,
while others provide developers with simpler tools or familiar
languages, thereby reducing the learning cost and enabling a
quick start for the beginners.
The public information on the blockchain causes the privacy
issues during the executions of smart contracts. Kosba et
al. [135] propose the Hawk framework. Developers could
write Hawk contracts and set privacy portion φpriv and public
portion φpub in the contract, where φpriv helps to hide the
private input of users, while φpub refers to the data that is
allowed to be publicly disclosed. Accordingly, a standard con-
tract will be generated automatically in the framework, along
with cryptographic protocols that ensure the correctness of the
contract (Definition 14) and privacy of the users. Therefore,
developers with little knowledge of the complex cryptographic
schemes can also efficiently construct a privacy-preserving
smart contract. Hawk implements zero-knowledge succinct
non-interactive argument of proof (zk-SNARK) [209] [210]
and other cryptographic schemes to ensure the privacy of the
smart contract. The authors also give the security proof under
the UC framework [211]. However, Hawk has not yet been
open-sourced (up to August 2020). Eberhardt and Tai [136]
adopt a similar idea to describe off-chain computation using
zk-SNARK, and propose a toolbox named ZoKrates. ZoKrates
includes a special high-level language for describing off-chain
computation, and a compiler that compiles the contract to a
zero-knowledge proof protocol. The toolbox is open-sourced,
but a formal security proof is absent, compared to Hawk.
Other than frameworks that simplify the designing of smart
contracts, there are also frameworks aimed at facilitating the
security analysis, based on verifiable languages, game theory,
finite state machine model, etc. Smart contracts under these
frameworks are more suitable with security analysis, thus
making the analysis results more accurate and convincing, as
is discussed in the following.
F? [212] is a specially designed language targeted for
security analysis. Bhargavan et al. [137] propose a framework
that translates smart contracts into F? to further conduct the
security analysis. Concretely, it compiles (resp. decompiles)
the Solidity code (resp. EVM bytecode) into F?, and evaluates
the equivalence between these two results. Such equivalence
reveals the correctness of the functionality (on the source
code layer) and the runtime security (on the bytecode layer).
However, the authors only give several simple examples, and
a complete scheme for the compilation and decompilation is
not provided.
Smart contracts usually involve multiple parties with con-
flicting interests, where the game theory works well. Chatterjee
et al. [138] describe smart contracts as a two-party game, and
further propose a quantitative stateful game-theoretic frame-
work. The core technique in this framework is the refinement
of abstraction, which is used to avoid state space explosion
during the modeling of two-party game. A simplified contract
language without loop instructions is also proposed, to support
concurrent instructions of the parties. It is used in the game-
theoretic model, and the authors claim that it can be translated
into Solidity. However, the corresponding compiler is not
provided in their work.
Besides, state machine can also be applied to describe the
state transitions in smart contracts. Mavridou et al. [139]
regard the smart contracts as finite state machines, and propose
the FSolidM framework. They build a graphical user interface
to efficiently design smart contracts. In addition, they pro-
vide several plugins that can be used to detect some known
vulnerabilities on the generated smart contracts. In their later
work [140], the authors propose the VeriSolid framework,
which extends the supported Solidity expressions and updates
the code generator. Formal operational semantics are also
provided in the latter work. VeriSolid enables developers to de-
scribe the security properties of a contract, and verifies whether
the generated contract meets such targets. Xu and Fink [141]
also apply the state machine model on smart contracts, but they
focus on the behavior of smart contracts in the business field.
They propose the Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) model,
which is written in TLA+ language [208], to describe the
properties that a contract must satisfy. Finally, the Temporal
Logic model Checker (TLC) is also proposed in [141], to
ensure that the contract meets the user-defined properties.
However, the state machine model may fail to describe some
smart contracts because of the space explosion problem. This
could be a research direction for future optimization.
Apart from those popular and well-known models, there are
also some other models that are useful in contract designing
frameworks. Banach [142] proposes a framework using the
Event-B model [213], which is designed to describe and verify
the discrete event system. With this model and framework,
smart contracts can meet specific properties in the designing
23
TABLE VI
AUXILIARY TOOLS FOR SMART CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION
Ref. Year Type Main contributions Open-sourced*
[135] 2016 Framework Hawk framework for writing & compling privacy-preserving smart contracts. 7
[136] 2018 Framework ZoKrates framework for writing & executing off-chain contracts. 3
[137] 2016 Framework A framework for verifying smart contracts by translating both Solidity andEVM bytecode to F?. 7
[138] 2018 Framework &High-level language
A quantitative game-theoretic framework for analysis &
a corresponding contract programming language. 7
[139] 2018 Framework FSolidM framework modeling smart contracts as finite state machines, and aGUI for creating contracts. 3
[140] 2019 Framework VeriSolid framework extending FSolidM, supporting specifying and verifyingthe desired properties of a contract. 3
[141] 2019 Framework A framework defining business smart contracts in the state machine model,with a programming called TLA+ [208]. 7
[142] 2019 Framework A framework using the Event-B formal modaling for easier verification. 7
[143] 2019 Framework Takamaka framework for writing & executing smart contracts in Java. 7
[144] 2016 High-level language A functional programming language library for smart contracts. 3
[145] 2017 High-level language A domain specific language (DSL) for financial purpose. 3
[146] 2018 High-level language A formal definition of the syntax and semantics for a large subset of Solidity,designed for symbolic execution and formal proof of smart contracts. 7
[147] 2018 High-level language Flint language for inherently safer contracts. 3
[148] 2019 High-level language Featherweight Solidity, a calculus for Solidity, supporting precise definition ofthe behavior of smart contracts 7
[149], [150] 2018-2019 IR language A Intermediate language suitable for formal analysis and verification. 33
[151] 2017 Basic tools A formal definition of EVM in Lem language, which can be combined withmultiple theorem proovers to verify smart contracts. 3
[152] 2018 Basic tools An extension of [151] with a sound program logic at the bytecode level. 3
[90] 2018 Basic tools A semantic framework of EVM bytecode and its formalization in F?. 3
[153] 2018 Basic tools A formal definition of EVM using K framework, which can be combined withmultiple theorem proovers to verify smart contracts. 3
*: 3 (resp. 7) here represents that the corresponding tool is open-sourced (resp. not). When there are multiple references in the same line, there
will be multiple 3 or 7 in the same order.
layer, and in turn, the security analysis becomes relatively
easier. However, this work needs further improvement, on both
completeness of description and syntactic complexity, to be
brought into real practice.
There are also studies introducing general programming
languages into the context of smart contracts. Spoto [143]
proposes the framework Takamaka that implements Java as
the programming language. In Takamaka, Java programmers
can easily develop smart contracts with the familiar tools.
Takamaka specially designs a Storage class for smart contracts,
and a gas computing mechanism related to Ethereum. To
avoid malicious programs or abused functions in Java, it
also maintains a whitelist of permitted functions for contract
developing. In addition, the framework also allows clients to
use Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to run smart contract byte-
code, taking advantage of JVM’s excellent bytecode execution
rate and garbage collection mechanism. But this also makes
it incompatible with the state-of-the-art Ethereum. In other
words, it requires a hard fork to take effect. Moreover, the
framework is still under development and not released yet.
b) Contract languages: Researchers for contract lan-
guage are devoted to improving the security of smart con-
tracts (Definition 13), including avoiding common errors, and
making it more suited for security analysis. Some schemes
restrict the functionalities that the language can achieve, so
that errors will be less likely to occur. Others do some further
semantic abstraction and (or) modifications on the basis of
the original language, to facilitate vulnerability detection. In
this section, we summarize the contract languages proposed
in these studies.
Most languages for contract programming, (e.g., Solidity,
Serpent), are used for procedural (or imperative) programming,
where the states in the contract are changed by multiple state-
ments. While in the functional programming, programs are
composed of multiple functions. Pettersson and Edström [144]
argue that functional programming can help to avoid many
common errors during the construction. In addition, it is easier
to apply detection tools in contracts written by functional lan-
guages. Accordingly, the authors propose a Idris [214] library
(Idris is a funtional programming language), taking advantage
of its dependent type. They further design a compiler from
Idris to Serpent, to illustrate the feasibility of their conclusion.
In addition to functional programming languages, some
researchers have proposed several domain specific languages
to improve the security of contracts under specific scenarios.
Findel [145] is a language for financial contracts. By separat-
ing the contract description and execution methods, financial
contract developers can just pay attention to the contents of
the contract itself, without concerning about how the contracts
are executed. The authors argue that Findel can be used in
common financial derivatives, and they conduct a test of this
language on Ethereum.
Based on the formalization of the syntax and semantics
in Solidity, Lolisa [146] is a language aimed at making the
contract more suitable for security analysis. Lolisa and Solidity
could be converted into each other with proper compilers.
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Moreover, it is more convenient to do symbolic execution on
contracts written in Lolisa. It comes with an interpreter that
converts it to Coq [192], a specially designed language for
semantic verification. Taking Lolisa as the intermediary, the
security of smart contracts in Solidity can be easily analyzed.
Based on a similar idea, Crafa et al. [148] define the formal
semantics in the core of Solidity, and propose a high-level
language named Featherweight Solidity. The behavior of the
Solidity contract could be accurately defined with it. In this
way, analysis tools can directly analyze contracts in Solidity
without converting them into EVM bytecode. In addition, the
analysis results show that there are defects in the type system
of Solidity, i.e., runtime type errors are unavoidable in current
systems. Further suggestions are provided in [146].
Apart from the semantic abstraction and definition of the
original language, other studies focus on the design of in-
termediate languages (IR) that are useful in the process of
contract compilation and verification. Sergey et al. [149] [150]
point out that most high-level languages sacrifice verifiability
in order to improve their expressivity. In other words, the
security verification on contracts in these languages is more
complex than those in low-level languages (e.g., bytecode). To
address this problem, they propose an intermediate language
SCILLA. High-level languages can be compiled into SCILLA
for security analysis, before being further compiled into EVM
bytecode. It is designed based on the automaton model, and
it separates the modules of communication, calculation, and
state transition. Such modulation enables the analysis tool to
work in a focused manner. The contract compiled into SCILLA
will be further converted into the Coq [192], so as to utilize
the powerful analysis function of Coq. However, the scheme
has not yet been fully realized.
Adding security mechanisms to the original programming
language also helps to avoid potential security issues, since
Solidity only focuses on the expressivity and completeness
aspects, but does not consider the convenience for security
analysis. Schrans et al. [147] propose a high-level language
Flint, which: 1) adds a permission mechanism to limit unde-
sirable function calls; 2) optimizes the fund-related operations
to ensure safe transfer; 3) introduces an unmodifiable property
to limit the modification of key states; 4) uses the same ABI as
Solidity to ensure that contracts written in these two languages
can interact with each other. The above features reduce the
difficulty of designing contracts and the corresponding analysis
tools. The authors also provide an analysis tool that performs
syntax analysis on Flint contracts, and a compiler that com-
piles the contract into EVM bytecode.
c) Basic tools: Basic tools refer to some basic theories
that are used to develop higher-level tools (e.g., security
analysis tools, high-level languages, frameworks). Such re-
search usually involves the formal definition of the underlying
infrastructure (virtual machine, bytecode, etc.).
Some studies adopt different tools to formally define the
EVM. Such formal definitions are the key to designing contract
analysis tools. Hirai [151] gives a formal definition of EVM
in the Lem language that can be combined with analysis tools
(or framework), such as Coq [192], Isabelle/HOL [215], to
check the property of EVM. The author further proves some
security properties of EVM with Isabelle/HOL. Amani et al.
[152] extend Hirai’s work, and propose the sound program
logic for EVM, so that the correctness of a smart contract can
be verified with Isabelle/HOL. They also prove the correctness
of their program logic in their work. After [151], Hildenbrandt
et al. [153] propose KEVM, another formal definition of
EVM under the K framework [216]. KEVM is unambiguous,
readable and executable, which can be used as a theoretical
foundation for formal analysis of smart contracts. As an exam-
ple, the authors briefly describe a KEVM-based gas analysis
tool and a DSL for analyzing the ABI of smart contracts.
Further, with specially designed interpreters, KEVM passes
the official test suite [217] provided by Ethereum community.
The results show that KEVM is more efficient than the EVM
defined in [151], and can detect more types of vulnerabilities.
There are also studies formally defining EVM bytecode,
which contribute to designing high-level languages and analy-
sis tools. Grishchenko et al. [90] argue that the semantics in the
Ethereum Yellow Paper [3] are incomplete and do not follow
the standard rules of definition. They for the first time give
the definition of the small-step semantics of EVM bytecode.
They use the same F? language as the preceding work [89],
and their complete semantic framework of EVM serves as the
theoretic foundation of F?-based analysis tools.
VI. EXECUTING SMART CONTRACTS
In 2017, Buterin [218] made a speech on the design chal-
lenges of blockchain and smart contract mechanism, focusing
on the security and application aspects. In this section, we
list and group the studies on execution mechanisms of smart
contracts, most of which aiming at improving the privacy
and performance. Before we introduce these studies, we first
summarize the deficiencies on existing contract execution
mechanisms in the following, taking Bitcoin and Ethereum
as representatives. We remark that these deficiencies mainly
occur in the public blockchains (Definition 1), while if these
issues are handled properly, both public and consortium
blockchains will be benefited.
(1) Forced disclosure of smart contract contents. Although
pseudonyms are used in most blockchain systems to
protect users’ privacy, due to the inherent execution mech-
anisms of blockchains, the contents of smart contracts
are still forced to be disclosed in public, so that miners
can execute the contracts and all nodes can agree on
the final states. To fully guarantee the anonymity, some
blockchain systems even directly remove the smart con-
tract functionality, e.g., Zerocash [219]. But this is not an
ideal strategy, since smart contracts are quite attractive for
several application scenarios, if the privacy concerns are
eliminated.
(2) Low processing rate. In most blockchains, a transaction
must be verified, executed and packaged by all miners
before taking effect. But this duplicated and resource-
consuming strategy puts huge limitations on the process-
ing rate. Technically, the processing rate is subject to
basic parameters of a blockchain such as block size and
time interval between blocks. Although it is not difficult
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to modify these parameters, new problems [220] may
arise afterwards. For example, a bigger block size would
consume more space for storage, and a smaller interval
may result in frequent and undesirable forks. Therefore,
existing smart contract platforms are not suitable for
applications with high demands on the processing rate.
(3) Limited contract complexity. To ensure the liveness (Defi-
nition 4) of a blockchain, some mechanisms to prevent
DoS attacks are introduced. For instance, Bitcoin only
supports a limited set of operations, which essentially
prevents the occurrence of endless loops. As for Ethereum,
which supports Turing-complete language, introduces the
gas mechanism that limits the number of instructions in
a single transaction. On the one hand, these protective
mechanisms guarantee the liveness, while on the other
hand, they also limit the possibility of executing complex
smart contracts on-chain. That is, the applications with
sophisticated operations and heavy overheads are not
applicable in the existing blockchains.
As mentioned in Section IV, script-based blockchains are
only suitable for implementations of simple financial-related
contracts. Such systems are used more as a public ledger than
a smart contract platform in practice. Therefore, most related
research focuses on the improvement of Turing-complete
blockchains, and we divide them into three categories as
follows.
(1) Private contracts with extra tools. To avoid revealing
sensitive information in a contract, auxiliary tools such
as zero-knowledge proof (Definition 16), trusted execution
environment (Definition 17) are adopted in several studies.
These schemes are aimed at solving the forced content
disclosure problem mentioned above, and they at the same
time may help to mitigate the problems of processing rate
and complexity, as we will discuss in Section VI-A.
(2) Off-chain channels. In these schemes, the executions of
contracts are moved off-chain, to avoid the low transaction
processing rate and high confirmation delay. Meanwhile,
such methods also protect the privacy of contract contents
to some extent. We group the existing off-chain schemes
into payment channels and state channels in this paper, as
we will discuss in Section VI-B.
(3) Extensions on core functionalities. The core functionalities
here refer to the way of processing and executing smart
contracts in a blockchain. The improvements on such
functionalities usually require a (hard) fork (Definition 6),
or even an alternative blockchain would be proposed,
either increasing the functionalities a smart contract could
achieve, or improving the performance of a blockchain.
Among them, some are less relevant to smart contracts,
e.g., SegWit [221], side-chain [222] [223] and Shard-
ing [224], so they are omitted in this paper. We focus on
the improvements and extensions on contract execution
mechanisms, as we will discuss in Section VI-C.
We summarize the schemes discussed in this section in Ta-
ble VII according to the classification above. In the “Theory”
column, 3 denotes the scheme has both description and its cor-
responding security proof, 3 denotes that the scheme has only
description without a security proof; in the “Implementation”
column, 3 means that the scheme is implemented and open-
sourced, 3 denotes the scheme is implemented but not open-
sourced, and 7 represents that the scheme is not implemented.
We remark that the smart contracts below refer to those written
in Turing-complete languages, if not otherwise claimed.
A. Private Contracts with Extra Tools
In most mainstream public blockchains, smart contracts are
stored on-chain in a way that everyone can see and validate
their contents. In other words, to process a transaction that
calls a smart contract, all miners will operate accordingly to
the transaction and contract, and finally agree on the execution
results. Such a mechanism may cause privacy issues, e.g., a
business company may be curious about its competitor’s daily
sales and big orders. This will prevent the implementations of
some business contracts.
To deal with the privacy issues in smart contracts, some
cryptographic schemes or hardware tools are introduced,
and we call such solutions as private contracts with extra
tools. In the following, we group them into private contracts
based on secure multi-party computation (Definition 15), zero-
knowledge proof (Definition 16) and trusted execution envi-
ronment (Definition 17), and discuss them in Section VI-A1,
Section VI-A2 and Section VI-A3, respectively.
1) Secure multi-party computation: The goal of secure
multi-party computation (Def.15) is similar to that of smart
contracts, both of which involves multiple parties that do no
trust each other, and expects to generate the correct execution
results. To some extent, SMPC could be viewed as a special
form of smart contracts, apart from the fact that SMPC is
almost conducted off-chain. When combined with smart con-
tracts, SMPC could improve the privacy of contract executions,
and at the same time alleviate the problems caused by the high
latency and low throughput in a blockchain. Related studies
focus on the privacy, fairness and correctness of blockchain-
based SMPC, as in the following.
Some researchers are dedicated to improving data privacy
with the help of SMPC. Enigma [154] is a privacy-preserving
computation platform without a trusted third party. It records
the hash of key data on-chain to guarantee the integrity, and
utilizes SMPC to conduct the private computation. In this way,
no one gets any extra information except its own inputs and
outputs, according to the privacy property of SMPC.
In SMPC, fairness is another non-negligible problem.
Choudhuri et al. [155] regard blockchain as a tamper-resistant
public bulletin board that anyone can write on, and they adopt
the witness encryption (WE) method to solve the fairness
problem in SMPC. According to their scheme, all participants
will get their desired outputs, or no one gets them at the end
of the protocol.
From another aspect, Sánchez [156] combines SMPC with
proof-carrying code [225], and proposes Raziel to guarantee
the correctness of smart contract codes and their executions. In
Raziel, SMPC is used to guarantee the correctness and privacy
of contract executions, and proof-carrying code ensures the
correctness and verifiability of the contract codes. In addition,
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[163] – 2015 Duplex Network (BTC) 3 7
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[164] – 2016 Comparison of Payment Channel Networks (BTC) 3 7
[165], [166] –, Bolt 2016-2017 Anonymous Payment Channel Network (BTC) 33 73
[167] Fulgor & Rayo 2017 Concurrency of Payment Channel Network (BTC) 3 3
[62] AMHL 2019 Payment Channel against Wormhole Attacks (BTC) 3 3
[168], [169] –, Sparky 2015-2016 Lightning Network (ETH) 33 37
[170] Raiden 2017 Advanced Payment Channel Network (ETH) 3 3
[171] PERUN 2017 Virtual Payment Channel (ETH) 3 3
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[24] – 2018 State-Channel for Online Poker 3 3
[172] – 2018 General State Channel 3 7
[173] Sprites 2017-2019 Worse-Case Time Optimization 3 3
[174] – 2019 Multi-Party Virtual State Channels 3 7
[175] – 2018 Conflicts in State Channel 3 3
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[178] PISA 2019 State Channel Outsourcing 3 3
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Improving Security [183] PCSCs 2018 Proof-Carrying Smart Contracts 3 7
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Efficiency &
Privacy
[184] Arbitrum 2018 One-Step Proof of Execution 3 3
[185] YODA 2018 Complex Contracts without Validation 3 3
[186] ZEXE 2018 Private Execution of Arbitrary Contract 3 3
*: – denotes the proposed scheme is not named in the literature.
†: 3 denotes the scheme has description and security proof, 3 means the scheme has description without a security proof.
♣: 3 denotes the scheme is implemented and open-sourced, 3 means the scheme is implemented but closed-sourced, 7 represents the scheme is not implemented.
Raziel also adopts non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to
prevent the proof-of-code from revealing extra information.
Smart contracts in the format of SMPC protocols are
more flexible and not constrained by the inherent execution
mechanisms of blockchain. These schemes are usually applied
on the application layer that does not rely on the execution
mechanisms too much, and they only disclose contract con-
tents among the participants, thus protecting the privacy of
users. However, such solutions require all participants online to
complete the computation protocol, which may be unrealistic
in some cases. Moreover, existing SMPC schemes are fea-
tured with high computational and communication complexity,
which can be new obstacles for smart contracts to be widely
adopted. In comparison, the solutions with zero-knowledge
proof described below can slightly reduce the overhead of
communication.
2) Zero-knowledge proofs: Zero-knowledge proof (Def.16)
is a popular and relatively mature cryptographic technique to
protect users’ privacy. Several efficient non-interactive solu-
tions are proposed in recent years, which are quite suitable in
the context of blockchain and smart contracts. For example,
zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowl-
edge (zk-SNARK) [209] [210] is widely used in blockchain,
with which the correctness of computation can be verified in a
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non-interactive way and fewer resources are required. Related
studies mainly focus on improving the transparency of the
ZKP adoption in the blockchain, i.e., enable developers to
write private contracts even when they do not know the detail
of ZKP protocols.
Quorum [6] is a typical example to protect the privacy of
contract contents using ZKP. It is derived from Ethereum,
while the smart contracts are divided into two types: public
and private contracts. The public ones are the same as those
in Ethereum, while the private ones interact among contract
participants using zk-SNARK, and update corresponding states
without revealing extra information, thus avoiding privacy
leakage during the contract execution procedures.
Rather than propose an alternative system, there are also
some researchers attempting to automatically integrate the
ZKP protocol into the Ethereum smart contracts within the
design process. Hawk [135] framework is a typical example
that applies zk-SNARK. It automatically generates smart con-
tracts and the corresponding protocols that guide the users to
protect their legitimate rights and interests during the contract
execution. Eberhardt and Tai [136] also present a toolkit
named ZoKrates based on zk-SNARK for private contracts.
Different from Hawk, the contracts constructed in ZoKrates
are mostly executed off-chain. ZoKrates comes with a high-
level domain specific language, which is used to describe
the off-chain computation. The authors also give a compiler
to generate transactions that submit the final results on-
chain. Using the specialized language and compiler provided
by ZoKrates, developers could easily and implicitly write a
private contract without understanding zk-SNARK.
We remark that the schemes mentioned above are irrelevant
to the core execution mechanisms of smart contracts (e.g.,
virtual machine). There are also some schemes that apply ZKP
to the underlying mechanisms to protect privacy. We leave
such solutions to Section VI-C3.
Although the ZKP-based execution schemes effectively hide
the contents of smart contracts, they inevitably introduce more
time and space overhead, increasing the burden of miners
for validating and executing the transactions. Besides, ZKP
schemes such as zk-SNARK require a trusted setup, and how
to remove such a setup in an efficient way remains a challenge.
To sum up, although ZKP-based private contract schemes
avoid the heavy multi-round communication introduced by
SMPC, problems in the aspects of efficiency, storage and
trusted setup are still suspending. The contract execution
schemes based on the trusted execution environment (Defi-
nition 17) increase the efficiency by adding new assumptions
on the hardware security, i.e., assuming the reliability of TEE
itself, as discussed below.
3) Trusted execution environment: Taking advantage of
trusted execution environment (Definition 17) hardware, such
as Intel SGX [226] and ARM TrustZone [227], the privacy
of contract contents can also be guaranteed. Relevant studies
mainly focus on the practical applications and execution
efficiency, as well as weakening the dependence on specific
types of TEE.
TEE solves some problems that are difficult for traditional
cryptographic schemes, such as privacy and fairness. There
are several studies discussing the ways to protect contract
contents with TEE. Brandenburger et al. [157] introduce SGX
into Hyperledger Fabric, to enable trusted private executions
of smart contracts. In their scheme, efficiency is sacrificed
to some extent, due to the employment of extra hardware.
However, since the efficiency of Hyperledger Fabric has been
greatly improved compared with other public blockchains like
Ethereum, such loss is acceptable. Almost simultaneously,
Bowman et al. [158] propose the so-called private data ob-
jects (PDOs), which utilizes TEE to execute contracts and
update the state. However, PDO is designed for consortium
blockchains, and thus many security threats are excluded from
consideration in their work.
Some researchers point out that TEE can also be used
to solve the problem of fairness in SMPC. Choudhuri et
al. [155] propose a solution to achieve fairness in SMPC
that combines TEE with blockchain. However, their scheme
only achieves one-time SMPC, that is, each invocation re-
quires a new setup, so it is only suitable for some special
contracts, for example, one-time lottery, voting, etc. Enclave-
Ledger Interaction (ELI) [161] is a general blockchain-based
SMPC solution, which converts the multi-step computation
into a protocol involving three parties: a public ledger (i.e.,
a blockchain), TEE and a host application. The scheme only
uses the blockchain as an underlying component, but puts no
requirement on the mechanism of blockchain.
To address the privacy and fairness issues in Bitcoin,
Teechain [162] is proposed to prevent the malicious behaviors
during the establishment and settlement of Bitcoin Lightning
Network [17]. In Teechain, TEE serves as the trust root to
ensure the legitimate rights and interests of all parties, during
the execution of the off-chain payments.
Actually, the introduction of TEE brings in a new security
assumption, i.e., assuming the adopted TEE hardware is se-
cure. Some studies try to weaken this assumption to some
extent. In Ekiden [159], the executions of transactions are
moved into TEE, and the TEE provides the proof of the correct
execution. In this way, no one except the participants knows
the content of a contract, and each participant only knows the
inputs and outputs of the private computation. Since it does
not put limitation on the specific types of TEE, Ekiden to
some extent avoids trusting a single TEE provider. Besides,
Ekiden also manages to optimize the processing rate in TEE.
While keeping the contents private, it handles thousands of
transactions per second, which is nearly 100 times compared
with that in Ethereum.
TEE could also be used to support complex smart con-
tracts that are infeasible otherwise. FASTKITTEN [160] is a
typical TEE-based scheme that extends Bitcoin to support
arbitrary smart contracts. It focuses on the efficiency of off-
chain contract execution. In FASTKITTEN, smart contracts are
executed in an operator’s TEE, where the operator works like
a miner in a way that it obtains no trust from the others,
and it will not learn anything about the contract. To improve
the efficiency of validation, check points are introduced. Any
one can start from any check point to calculate the final
state in the blockchain. In addition, FASTKITTEN adopts the
mechanisms of challenge-response and deposit-penalty, where
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the former is used to identify malicious behaviors and the latter
is used to charge a penalty if someone misbehaves. In this
way, rational participants will behave themselves and honest
ones can always get their deserved money. FASTKITTEN also
describes the process of off-chain transactions, and further
provides a formal security proof.
By assuming the reliability of TEE, the efficiency loss of
contract executions caused by the complex and heavy crypto-
graphic schemes is avoided. However, this strategy increases
the cost of contract executors (or miners), since they have
to update their hardware, and validate the proof of correct
executions before packaging the transactions. In addition, the
assumption of TEE being always secure might not be realistic
because there can be bugs and vulnerabilities in the TEE
equipment, which will bring in new points of attack. For
example, the latest study [228] shows a subversive attack for
SGX. Moreover, in terms of reliability, there are concerns that
device providers may insert backdoor into their products.
B. Off-Chain Channels
In order to resist various attacks against blockchain (e.g.,
DoS attacks), smart contracts inevitably have bottlenecks in
transaction processing performance. Therefore, to improve
the efficiency, one solution is to execute contracts in off-
chain channels, and only release the settling transactions on
the blockchain. To some extent, this also hides the contract
contents and the details of users’ interactions. We divide
the state-of-the-art off-chain schemes into payment and state
channels, and we conclude that related research mainly focuses
on the security, fairness, efficiency, and feasibility issues. In
the following, Section VI-B1 interprets payment channels, and
Section VI-B2 discusses the state channels.
1) Payment channels: We have discussed the micropay-
ment channel protocol in Section IV-A3, which derives many
advanced payment channel network (PCN) schemes. Most
of these schemes are aimed at achieving fair and efficient
payments off-chain. In the following, we will introduce
PCN schemes in Bitcoin and Ethereum respectively, in Sec-
tion VI-B1a and Section VI-B1b. The main difference be-
tween the two categories is due to the transaction model
(Definition 10, 11) and contract language, and the design of
PCN schemes in Ethereum is more convenient because of the
general-purpose language.
a) Payment channel networks in Bitcoin: Since Bitcoin
only supports limited operations in smart contracts, off-chain
protocols must be carefully designed. The initial design of
micropayment channel only supports one-way payment (see
Section IV-A3), that is, a receiver cannot use the same channel
to send money back to the sender. For this issue, several solu-
tions for bidirectional channels are proposed, some of which
try to realize the functionality of such off-chain payments,
while others improves the preceding schemes for privacy or
security issues, as is discussed below.
Based on the micropayment channel [13] scheme, Lightning
Network [17] is proposed. It is a network composed of many
bidirectional payment channels and enables the duplex transfer
of funds between two users without a direct channel.
P1 P2 P3 P4
1. Hr = Fhash(r )
2. HTLC3t (P1, P2, Hr , x + 2δ) 3. HTLC2t (P2, P3, Hr , x + δ) 4. HTLCt (P3, P4, Hr , x)
5. r6. r7. r
Fig. 11. Using hashed timelock contract (HTLC) to establish a Lightning
Network [17]. To get Bx from P1, P4 first selects a random number r and
sends its hash value Hr = Fhash(r) to P1. Next, P1 generates a HTLC
HTLC3t (P1, P2, y, x + 2δ), where 3t is the timelock, and δ is the fee that an
intermediary charges. Similarly, P2 (resp. P3) sends their HTLC to P3 (resp.
P4), where the lock time decreases. P4 uses R to claim the Bx in HTLCt ,
and passes r to P3, and r is passed through the channel in the same manner.
To establish bidirectional channels, revocable sequence ma-
turity contract (RSMC) [17] is introduced. Informally, in
RSMC, two parties generate a deposit transaction that col-
lateralizes the funds to a multi-signature address. Then they
sign the refund transactions as a refund commitment, which
includes an expiration time. The party that broadcasts the
refund transaction first is restricted to claim the refund after the
expiration time, while the other party can immediately get the
refund. Thereby, it prevents the deliberate refund operation.
Then, the refund commitments are signed and broadcast.
Thereafter, both parties update the payment value off-chain.
This will involve multiple public and private key pairs and
addresses. Each time a new transaction is generated, the two
parties have to send the old key pair to the other, which is
regarded as an agreement to accept the new transaction and
give up the old one. During the update process, if either party
broadcasts the old refund commitment, the other can get all
the funds that are deposited earlier.
In payment channel networks, there are cases when two
users without a direct channel want to make an off-chain
payment. In this situation, hashed timelock contract (HTLC)
is used. We show a brief description of HTLC in Fig. 11 [17],
where there is a path from P1 to P4 (i.e., P1 → P2 → P3 →
P4). To get Bx from P1, P4 selects a random number r and
sends its hash value y = Fhash(r) to P1. Next, P1 generates a
HTLC contract HTLC3t (P1, P2, y, x + 2δ), where the subscript
3t stands for the timelock (as discussed in Section IV-A3),
and δ is the fee that each intermediary charges. P2 (resp. P3)
sends their HTLC to P3 (resp. P4) in a similar way, where the
lock time decreases to ensure that the intermediaries behave
honestly. P4 uses r to claim the Bx in HTLCt , and passes the
r to P3, and r is passed through the channel in the same
manner. All rational intermediaries have the motivation to
behave honestly, or they will lose their money.
The Lightning Network is the combination of RSMC and
HTLC, and is one of the most popular PCN solutions. It is
implemented in many languages, such as C language [229],
Scala language [230], etc.
Most steps in the Lightning Network protocols are off-chain
and conducted in a fixed way, and only the establishment and
settlement is done on-chain. Therefore, the Lightning Net-
work reduces the frequent small transactions on-chain, avoids
the transaction delay, and somehow improves the transaction
throughput of the blockchain.
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(c) An intance of duplex micropayment channel with n = 1 and depth d = 3
Fig. 12. Duplex micropayment channel [163] with maximum time tmax = 100,
minimum time tmin = 99, additional branches per node n = 1, maximum
invalidation depth d = 3. When the funds in one of the channels in the first
line are exhausted, both parties update the channel, reset the initial funds, and
decrease the value of t in order, as in the second and third lines.
Almost simultaneously, Decker and Wattenhofer [163] pro-
pose another duplex micropayment channel scheme, which
uses a diminishing time lock to prevent the other party from
aborting. In Fig. 12(a) [163], we give an illustration of the
one-way micropayment channel like that in [13], and in
Fig. 12(b) [163], we show the method to update the channel
with the reducing time lock. The branch with a smaller time
lock t can be confirmed earlier in the system, so that the values
in the bidirectional channel are updated. With this method, the
duplex micropayment channel is shown in Fig. 12(c) [163].
Firstly, both parties set the maximum and minimum value of t,
additional branches per node n (n = 1 Fig. 12), and maximum
invalidation depth d (d = 3 Fig. 12). After that, the two parties
use the duplex micropayment channel pair in the first line to
conduct the payments. When the fund in one of the channels
is exhausted, both parties update the channel, reset the initial
funds, and decrease the value of t in order, as shown in the
second and third lines. Similarly, by connecting channels end
by end, such duplex payment channels can also be extended
into a PCN.
The above two bidirectional payment channel schemes [17],
[163] are compared and analyzed in [164], in terms of on-chain
privacy, operational overheads, outsourcing, etc.
From another point of view, the above two PCN schemes
can not fully protect users’ privacy. For example, the hash
lock in HTLC could be used to track the participants in the
same path. Heilman et al. [165] adopt blind signature [231]
and realize a fair, anonymous and off-chain exchange of BTC
with vouchers issued by an untrusted third-party. This scheme
is compatible with both Lightning Network and duplex mi-
cropayment channels described above. Green and Miers [166]
introduce an opcode OP_BOLT, to achieve the anonymity in
three forms of micropayment channels (one-way, bidirectional,
and PCN). However, this solution is only applicable to plat-
forms that are born with anonymity (e.g., ZeroCash [219]) or
other cryptocurrencies that support coin mixing. Intuitively,
both the solutions of [165] and [166] require a soft fork
(Definition 7) to take effect.
Some researchers point out that the aforementioned PCN
solutions could not handle the concurrency of off-chain pay-
ments well, which might cause problems such as transaction
blocking or conflicting. Malavolta et al. [167] propose two
protocols for the concurrency issues in PCN, namely, Fulgo
and Rayo. Fulgo comes with formal provable privacy within
the UC model [211], and it is compatible with Bitcoin’s
script language. When a conflict occurs, all the conflicting
transactions will be cancelled and resent after a certain delay,
to prevent the permanent blocking. Rayo is another scheme
guaranteeing that at least one of the payments will be com-
pleted, yet it to some extent sacrifices privacy compared
with Fulgo. They also propose an advanced multi-hop HTLC,
which introduces randomness to the time lock and combines
ZKP (Definition 16) to avoid privacy leakage of the routing
information.
In terms of the fairness in PCN, based on [167], Malavolta
et al. [62] propose a new PCN protocol that’s secure against
the wormhole attack, where an adversary that controls multiple
intermediaries can exclude the honest nodes in the path, by di-
rectly passing the random preimage r to other corrupted nodes.
Their solution assigns a random number to each intermediary
so that the adversary can no longer conduct the original attack,
and thereby honest participants have sufficient incentives to
serve as intermediaries. This solution improves the fairness
of PCN, and preserves the interests of honest participants.
Moreover, the authors provide a formal security proof within
the UC model.
b) Payment channel networks in Ethereum: The afore-
mentioned payment channel networks are also useful in
Turing-complete blockchains such as Ethereum, and the de-
ployment of PCN in these systems is more convenient. Related
research can be divided into studies in the theoretic and
application aspects, as discussed in the following.
In the theoretic aspect, Tremback and Hess [168] propose
a general model for payment channels, where smart contracts
in Turing-complete languages are used (they are called smart
conditions in their work). However, the implementation and
security proof are not given. The authors also propose a routing
protocol that finds suitable path for the payment, but the
concept of routing is beyond the scope of our paper, so we
omit the description here.
In the application aspect, Peterson [169] implements the
Lightning Network on Ethereum with the Solidity language.
While Raiden [170] is another advanced version of the Light-
ning Netowrk that improves the throughput of blockchain
system. What’s more, Raiden tries to add more functionalities
other than the processing of standard transactions, such as
updating variables in smart contracts. However, it is still under
development and only supports the standard off-chain payment
for now.
Similar to the PCNs mentioned in the previous part, earlier
PCN solutions in Ethereum also suffer from the problems of
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ledger:
Ingrid
yI − xB zI − xA
βA βBAlice
yA − xA
Bob
zB − xB
xA xB
γ
contract CA contract CB
Fig. 13. Virtual payment channel in PERUN [171]. βA and βB represent
the payment channel between Alice and Ingrid, Bob and Ingrid, respectively.
CA and CB are the corresponding smart contracts on the blockchain. In βA,
the amounts deposited by Alice and Ingrid (resp. Bob and Ingrid) are yA
and yI (resp. zB and zI ), respectively. With βA and βB , the virtual payment
channel γ is created. Alice’s and Ingrid’s deposits in βA, yA and yI , are
partially frozen, which goes similarly for zB and zI in βB .
feasibility and privacy. As pointed out by Dziembowski et
al. [171], although such schemes support efficient off-chain
payment, they require the intermediaries to be always online,
so that they could forward the necessary messages along the
path and monitor possible misbehaviors of others. Besides,
from the privacy perspective, the intermediaries will know the
identities of the sender and receiver, and the amount of trans-
action. To address these problems, the virtual payment channel
PERUN [171] is proposed. It builds a virtual payment channel
between two users basing on the established payment channels,
as shown in Fig. 13 [171]. In this way, the intermediaries are
only involved during the establishment and settlement of the
virtual channel. In addition, paper [171] also gives the security
proof of the scheme within the UC model, and gives a proof-
of-concept implementation on Ethereum.
The virtual payment channel implemented by PERUN is il-
lustrated in Fig. 13 [171]. There is a payment channel between
Alice and Ingrid, denoted as βA. Similarly, βB represents
the payment channel between Bob and Ingrid. There are two
corresponding smart contracts CA and CB on the blockchain.
In βA, the amounts deposited by Alice and Ingrid are yA and
yI , respectively, and the amounts deposited by Bob and Ingrid
in βB are zB and zI , respectively. With βA and βB, a virtual
payment channel γ is built. Deposit in βA will be partially
frozen when creating γ, namely, yA for Alice and yI for Ingrid,
respectively. Similarly, zB and zI will be frozen for Bob and
Ingrid in βB, respectively. To prevent these deposits from being
frozen permanently, the three participants will set an expiration
time when establishing the channel. After the expiration time,
or when the channel γ is settled on-chain, they can freely
retrieve their deposits.
2) State channels: Inspired by PCN, the updates of vari-
ables in smart contracts can also be conducted off-chain, which
is the key point of state channel networks [232] [233]. A
state channel updates the states in smart contracts according to
the predefined functions and algorithms in an off-chain way.
Similar to PCN, only the establishing and settling transactions
are conducted on-chain. Related research mainly focuses on
the generalization, usability, efficiency and privacy of state
channel networks.
One typical application of state channel network is the
online poker. Bentov et al. [24] design and implement an
efficient online poker contract on Ethereum, i.e., secure cash
distribution with penalty, which transfers the money from
losers to winners as soon as the game is finalized. The authors
also give the security proof within the UC model. In fact, the
online poker scheme is just a special case of state channel,
and this scheme can also be used for bidirectional payment
channels and other applications that involve smart contracts.
The online poker scheme mainly implements the ideal
multiple sequential cash distribution functionality F ∗MSCD, as
rephrased in Fig. 14 [24], where sid and ssid are session iden-
tifiers, P1, P2, · · · , Pn are n participants, A is the adversary,
whose corrupted nodes are represented as {Pa}a∈C , H is the
set of honest participants, namely, H = {1, ..., n}\C, h = |H |,
d is the deposit amount, q is the penalty amount, ®b is the fund
distribution vector, bi represents the funds that Pi deserves, m
is the number of functions, Freceive,P (resp. Fsend,P) is the ideal
function that receives (resp. sends) messages from (resp. to)
P, and Fbroadcast is the ideal broadcast function. The last field
in the messages with header SETUP, ADDMONEY, RETURN,
PENALTY, EXTRA and REMAINING is the value of fund.
There are three phases in F ∗MSCD. In the deposit phase, it
accepts deposits of value d from honest parties, as well as
the penalty of value hq from adversary A. In the execution
phase, each participant takes part in the multi-party functions
for several times with input payload pi, i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. The
execution results include the change Z on contract state S and
that on fund distribution vector ®b. In this phase, participants
can also increase their deposits. When the execution phase
is completed, or the adversary A aborts, the participants
enter the claim phase. If it is the former case, the honest
participant Pi will receive his deposit the fund of value d and
his deserved fund recorded in bi; if it is the latter case, the
honest participants can further share the adversary’s deposited
penalty of value hq and the additional penalty qi (if any).
Finally, F ∗MSCD returns the remaining funds to A.
In addition to online poker, state channels can also facilitate
the application of payment channels. Miller et al. [173]
specifically describe the model of state channels within the
UC framework, and construct an improved payment channel,
Sprites, that reduces the worst-case time to settle a transaction.
It constructs a global preimage manager PM contract to verify
the hash preimage instead of transferring it among participants,
as is done in the Lightning Network. The receiver directly
submits the preimage of the hash lock to PM for verification,
thereby reducing the time cost brought in by the transfer of
preimage. Besides, Sprites also supports dynamic deposit and
withdraw of fund, which greatly improves the usability of
the payment channels. However, it does not take the privacy
issues into consideration. The ideal functionality FState of a
state channel given in their work under the UC model is
rephrased in Fig. 15 [173]. FState initializes the variables, and
receives auxiliary input messages m from the smart contract
C, appends it to the stack buf and auxin, and sets the pointer
ptr . During the τth round of execution, it receives the payload
data pτ,i (i = 1, · · · , n) from each Pi within O(∆) time, and
forwards these messages to the adversary A. After receiving
all messages, it updates the function Fcontract with inputs
including: contract state S, inputs pτ,i (i = 1, · · · , n) and other
data in the stack. If there is any non-empty output o in FState,
it will be handled according to the output rule C.output.
Inspired by the concept of virtual payment channel in
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Deposit phase(sid,H ):
Upon invocation by any Pj or A:
Initialize f lg =⊥.
Freceive,Pj (SETUP, sid, ssid, j, d) for all j ∈ H .
Freceive,A(SETUP, sid, ssid, hq) where h = |H |.
Execution phase(sid):
Upon invocation by any Pj :
Initialize f lg = 0 and ®b← ®0.
For id = 1, 2, · · · , sequentially do:
1) If Freceive,Pj (EXIT, sid, ssid):
Fbroadcast(EXIT, sid, ssid, j),
go to the claim phase.
2) If Freceive,Pj (ADDMONEY, sid, ssid‖id, bj):
If Freceive,Pk (ADDMONEY, sid, ssid‖id, bj) for each k , j:
Fbroadcast(ADDMONEY, sid, ssid‖id, bj).
®b← ®b + (· · · , 0, bj, 0, · · · ).
3) Initialize state S =⊥.
Freceive,Pj (FUNCTION, sid, ssid‖id, g(id) for all j ∈ H .
Fbroadcast(FUNCTION, sid, ssid‖id, g(id)).
4) Parse g(id) = {g(id)
k
}k∈{1, · · · ,m}. For k = 1, · · · ,m, sequentially do:
a) Freceive,Pj (INPUT, sid, ssid‖id‖k, j, p′j) for all j ∈ H .
b) Freceive,A(INPUT, sid, ssid‖id‖k, {p′a}a∈C).
If no such message was received:
update f lg = 1 and go to the claim phase.
c) Compute (Z, ®b′, S′) ← g(id)
k
(p′1, · · · , p′n; S, ®b).
d) Fsend,A(OUTPUT, sid, ssid‖id‖k, Z, ®b′).
e) If Freceive,A(CONTINUE, sid, ssid‖id‖k):
Fsend,Pi (OUT, sid, ssid‖id‖k, Z, ®b′) for all Pi .
f) If Freceive,A(ABORT, sid, ssid‖id‖k):
set f lg = 1, and go to the claim phase.
g) ®b← ®b′.
Claim phase(sid, f lg, d, ®b,H, C):
Upon invocation by any Pj or A:
Freceive,A(EXTRA, sid, ssid, {qi}i∈H,∑i∈H qi), qi = 0 if not received.
If f lg = 0 or ⊥, Fsend,Pr (RETURN, sid, ssid, d + ®bi) for i ∈ H .
If f lg = 0, Fsend,A(RETURN, sid, ssid, hq +∑a∈C ba).
If f lg = 1, Fsend,Pi (PENALTY, sid, ssid, d + q + ®bi + qi) for i ∈ H .
Fsend,S(REMAINING, sid, ssid, Σa∈C ®ba).
Fig. 14. Ideal functionality F∗MSCD [24] for multiple sequential cash
distribution with penalties, where sid and ssid are session identifiers,
P1, P2, · · · , Pn are n participants, A is the adversary, whose corrupted nodes
are represented as {Pa }a∈C , H is the set of honest participants, namely,
H = {1, ..., n}\C, h = |H |, d is the deposit amount, q is the penalty amount,
®b is the fund distribution vector, bi represents the funds that Pi deserves,
m is the number of functions, Freceive,P (resp. Fsend,P) is the ideal function
that receives (resp. sends) messages from (resp. to) P, and Fbroadcast is the
ideal broadcast function. The last field in the messages with header SETUP,
ADDMONEY, RETURN, PENALTY, EXTRA and REMAINING is the value of
fund. pi, i ∈ {1, · · · , n} is the input payload.
PERUN [171], Dziembowski et al. [172] give the definition of
general state channel, which supports the off-chain execution
of arbitrary smart contracts. Similar to PERUN, a higher-level
channel is built upon two existing channels with a common
third party. These higher-layer channels are called virtual state
channels. The users only need to interact with their common
third party, rather than the blockchain, to open and close the
higher channel. Conflicts are firstly resolved by this third
party, and if it fails, contracts on the blockchain are then
invoked. As shown in Fig. 16 [172], there are 5 state channels
recorded by on-chain smart contracts from P1 to P6, and
γ1 (resp. γ2) is the first-layer virtual state channel between
P1 and P3 (resp. P4 and P6). Further, γ3 is a higher-level
virtual state channel, and γ4 is built upon γ3 and γ2. The
authors also give the ideal functionality of state channel and
Initialize(auxin, ptr , S, buf):
Upon invocation by C:
auxin ←⊥
ptr ← 0
S ← ∅
buf← ∅
Input(C.input(m)):
Upon invocation by C:
append m to buf and auxin, j ← |buf| − 1
within ∆: set ptr ← max(ptr, j)
Proceed(τ):
Upon invocation by C:
for each party Pi:
Freceive,Pi (pτ,i)
if pτ,i is not received within O(∆): pτ,i ←⊥
Fsend,A(i, pτ,i)
after receiving all inputs:
(S, o) ← Fcontract(S, {pτ,i}, auxin[ptr])
if Pi for all i = 1, · · · N are honest:
Fsend,Pi (S) within time O(1)
else:
Fsend,Pi (S) within O(∆)
if o ,⊥:
invoke C.output(o) within O(∆)
Fig. 15. Ideal functionality of state channel FState [173], where A is the
adversary, Pi, i = 1, · · · , n are n participants, auxin is the auxiliary input by
contract C, ptr is the pointer for the buff stack buf, S is the state of contract,
Fcontract is the contract function, ∆ is the time limit, τ is the round number,
pτ, i (i = 1, · · · , n) is the payload data from Pi in τth round, and o is the
output.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
γ1 γ2
γ3
γ4
Fig. 16. Construction of virtual state channels [172]. Pi, i = 1, · · · , 6 are 6
participants, with 5 state channels conncted as a chain. γ1 (resp. γ2) is the
first-layer virtual state channel between P1 and P3 (resp. P4 and P6). Further,
γ3 is a higher-level state channel, and γ4 is built upon γ3 and γ2.
virtual state channel within the UC framework, and a formal
security proof. At the same time, Coleman et al. [234] propose
the Counterfactual framework, which is aimed at building a
general state channel that enables the update of arbitrary smart
contracts. In their framework, developers no longer have to
design specific state channels for their application. However,
the scheme lacks formal security proof, and their framework
is still under development.
The aforementioned schemes of state channel network
in [24], [172], [173], [234] only support 2-party smart con-
tracts. In other words, contracts that involve more parties
are not appliable in such state channels. Dziembowski et
al. [174] propose a multi-party virtual state channel. It retains
the advantages of the virtual state channel [172], that is, a
state channel could be opened and closed without interacting
with the blockchain (in the best case). Moreover, the process
is almost instantaneous and zero-cost. As for the worst case,
they reduce the time for conflict resolution from O(n∆) to
O(∆), where ∆ is the maximum time delay for on-chain
settlement. When multiple parties are involved, the potential
32
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
mpVSCC1/0 3/4
mpVSCC
2/0 2/4
mpVSCC
3/0 1/4
γ1/0 1/4
1/0
1/0
Fig. 17. An example of multi-party virtual state channel [174]. Five parties
from P1 to P5 are connected by 4 on-chain channels. P1, P3, P4 and P5
jointly build the multi-party virtual state channel γ that excludes P2. The
mpVSCC between them refers to the instance of the multi-party virtual state
channel contract. The x/y at the end of each channel indicates the initial/final
amount of participants in a contract.
security threats and conflicts become more complicated. To
alleviate this concern, Dziembowski et al. [174] apply the UC
framework and give a formal security proof in their work.
Intuitively, the multi-party virtual state channel requires that
all participants to stay in a common state channel network, as
shown in Fig. 17 [174], where five parties from P1 to P5 are
connected by 4 on-chain channels. P1, P3, P4 and P5 jointly
build the multi-party virtual state channel γ that excludes P2.
The mpVSCC between them refers to the instance of the multi-
party virtual state channel contract. The x/y at the end of each
channel indicate the initial/final amount in the contract.
On the security aspect, Close and Stewart [175] argue
that state channels applicable for arbitrary contracts may face
the following three conflicts: 1) conflicts related to external
states, i.e., data outside the blockchain, such as exchange rates
and temperatures; 2) concurrency conflicts occurring when
participants perform conflicting operations almost simultane-
ously and could not agree on the order of operations; 3)
silent conflict, i.e., one participant suddenly loses its response,
causing the suspending or abortion of off-chain operations. To
resolve these problems, the ForceMove [175] framework is
proposed, which puts constrains on the applications of the state
channel, so as to fundamentally avoid the first two conflicts.
Besides, ForceMove introduces a new operation named force-
move, to ensure that the last conflict is resolved smoothly.
Although state channel helps to avoid fees caused by
frequent transactions, when a dispute occurs, an honest party
has to submit a bunch of proofs of the final state to make
things work as expected. It is pointed out in [176] that such
proofs may involve a large amount of data, which will result
in high transaction fees. That means, an honest party has
to pay for the misbehavior of malicious parties. To protect
the interests of honest parties, Buckland et al. [177] propose
the concept of state assertion channels. In their scheme,
honest parties only submit the hash value of the final state
for finalization, avoiding high transaction fees. It adopts the
concept of optimistic smart contracts, where the update is
accepted without validation, and parties who disagree with it
can submit their proofs for invalidation. When a wrong update
is verified, the provider will be rewarded as their incentives.
From another perspective, honest parties in a state channel
are required to be constantly online, for fear that the counter-
party submits an older version of the states. This is sometimes
unrealistic. McCorry et al. [178] propose a solution named
PISA to outsource this work to a third party, and give a formal
security proof of their scheme. Moreover, a proof-of-concept
implementation based on a simplified version of Sprites [173]
is also provided in [178]. Compared with other outsourcing
solutions, such as Monitor [235] and WatchTower [236], it
only takes O(1) storage space for the third party (which is
O(N) in Monitor, where N is the number of transactions
generated off-chain), and it directly applies to Ethereum, while
WatchTower is not compatible with platforms such as Bitcoin
and Ethereum.
C. Extensions on Core Functionalities
Off-chain channels discussed above mainly focus on the
off-chain protocols, while retaining the original execution
mechanisms of the underlying blockchain. In this section, we
discuss several schemes that extend the core functionalities
of the smart contract platform. Specifically, Section VI-C1
introduces the extensions on opcodes that adds to the func-
tionalities of smart contracts could achieve; Section VI-C2
introduces the schemes that enhance the security of deployed
smart contracts; Section VI-C3 describes the solutions that
improve the efficiency and privacy of contract execution.
1) Extension on opcodes: By adding new opcodes, more
appealing functionalities could be achieved in smart contracts,
making them better meet the needs of daily use.
The covenant in Bitcoin refers to a mode that the future
transfer of the fund is restricted according to some user-defined
rules. This functionality enriches the application scenario of
Bitcoin. From this point of view, Möser et al. [179] extend
Bitcoin with an opcode that enables the so-called covenant
mode. This makes it possible to track the flow of a specific
payment. In addition, it also enables the vault transaction
which takes more time to take effect than a standard one.
Within this time, the owner possessing the recovery key can
invalidate the vault transaction, avoiding the economic loss
caused by the private key theft, and enhancing the security of
private key. O’Connor and Piekarska [180] propose another
opcode that only involves computational operations and leaves
out the transaction data, realizing the same functionality as
covenant. They also introduce an opcode that realize the vault
mode. Intuitively, both solutions above require a soft fork
(Definition 7) on Bitcoin.
There are also demands to move smart contracts across
blockchains, to get a better performance (which is relevant to
the target platform) or simply as backup. Fynn et al. [181] in-
troduce an opcode OP_MOVE in EVM, as well as a correspond-
ing keyword in Solidity, to realize the cross-chain moving of
smart contracts. Intuitively, such movement could only be done
between two blockchains with same execution environment
(i.e., EVM). In fact, Westerkamp [182] has already proposed
a similar moving protocol before [181], whose solution does
not involve the modification of opcodes, but requires a large
gas overhead for the migration.
2) Improvements on security: As mentioned in Section I,
smart contracts are hard to update due to the tamper-resistant
nature of blockchain. When a bug or vulnerability is found in
a deployed contract, users and developers can do nothing with
it to remedy the situation. To mitigate this risk, Dickerson
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et al. [183] propose the concept of Proof-Carrying Smart
Contracts (PCSCs) based on the idea of Proof-Carrying Codes.
Its implementation involves the modification of the underlying
consensus and execution mechanism, namely, the blockchain
only maintains the key properties of the deployed contracts.
The creator firstly uploads some key properties of the contract
to the blockchain as a commitment. After that, the miners
check that such key features remain unchanged before and
after the update operation. In this way, the upgrade of smart
contracts could be realized without harming the security of the
system.
3) Improvements on efficiency and privacy: With regard
to the privacy issues of smart contracts, we have introduced
several private contract schemes that utilize zero-knowledge
proofs in Section VI-A2. Schemes discussed here also use
cryptographic techniques including ZKP. But unlike the prior
solutions, the core functionalities of the original execution
mechanisms are modified and extended, to support efficient
and privacy-preserving executions of contracts, as will be
discussed in the following.
To improve the efficiency and privacy during smart contract
executions, Arbitrum [184] comes out with a re-designed
virtual machine. In Arbitrum, users delegate the off-chain
executions of smart contracts to trusted nodes. With the
one-step proof delivered by Arbitrum virtual machine, the
correctness of the execution is guaranteed. Such a proof only
leaks a very small part of privacy, and since the computation is
totally off-chain, no extra information of the contract will be
leaked. Moreover, the authors claim that with techniques like
Bulletproofs [237], zk-SNARKs [209], the leakage of privacy
could be further reduced. Arbitrum requires a reasonable in-
centive and penalty mechanism to ensure the correct execution
offered by rational participants. Since not all nodes participate
in the execution of a smart contract, the efficiency is also
improved.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the com-
plexity of smart contracts is limited due to the execution
mechanisms (e.g., limiting the gas consumption). For tradi-
tional smart contracts, the execution result is easy to verify.
However, for the complex contracts, the verification procedure
is non-trivial and it consumes a large amount of resources,
making it impossible to be performed on-chain. To solve this
problem, YODA [185] is proposed to help reach agreement on
the execution results of such complex contracts. It introduces
a non-deterministic off-chain execution mechanism, with ran-
domly selected nodes and a probability model to determine
the execution result. The most prominent feature of YODA is
that it eliminates the step of verifying the results on-chain.
To fully protect users’ privacy, Zerocash [219] introduces
the zk-SNARK scheme into its underlying execution mecha-
nism, but it gives up the functionality of smart contracts as a
consequence. Bowe et al. [186] extend Zerocash and propose
ZEXE. It utilizes the technique of 2-layer recursive proof with
properly selected cryptographic parameters, to achieve the
succinct zero-knowledge proof of arbitrary predicates defined
by users. With such recursive proofs, the contents and results
of smart contracts can be entirely hidden. The overhead of
this solution is comparable to that of Zerocash [219] and
Hawk [135]. In addition, the authors further provide the
security proof within the UC model.
To improve the efficiency and throughput of blockchains,
Poon and Buterin [238] construct a child-chain scheme
Plasma, with a series of contracts anchored on Ethereum.
Plasma uses the bitmap to map the funds spent to a single
bit, reducing the size of a transaction. It further alleviates the
problems of transaction congestion and limited throughput on
Ethereum. Participants can submit fraud proofs to Ethereum
to ensure the correct execution in child-chain. However, such
systems focus more on the security of consensus, and less on
the execution mechanism of smart contracts. Therefore, such
schemes are beyond the scope of this paper. Similar child-
chain schemes such as Cosmos [239], Polkadot [240], and side
chain schemes like [222], [223] are also out of our scope.
VII. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Smart contract is still a new and fresh concept, and is
attracting more and more researchers and developers into
this field. Since smart contracts are usually related to finan-
cial affairs, their security requirements and criteria are quite
distinct from those on general computer programs, which
make the construction of smart contracts a very skill-oriented
work. In addition, there are also many problems on existing
smart contract platforms such as privacy leakage, execution
efficiency, and contract complexity, which have also attracted
widespread attention. In this section, we summarize the previ-
ous research results and propose the future research directions
from the perspective of the construction and execution of smart
contracts.
• Design paradigms for script-based blockchains. Due
to the limitation of the expressivity of script languages
and opcodes in script-based blockchains, coupled with the
popularity of Turing-complete blockchains, contract con-
struction schemes on script-based blockchains have once
faded out from researchers’ perspectives. However, with
the emergence and implementation of off-chain channel
networks, designing a fair, efficient, and economic off-
chain network on script-based blockchains might be a
new promising research direction.
• Design tools for script-based blockchains. Similar to the
previous point, due to the limitation on script languages,
there is not much research on the design tools for script-
based blockchains. In contrast, design tools for Turing-
complete blockchains have grown rapidly in recent years.
Some analysis techniques for contracts may be adopted
into these script-based blockchains. Moreover, high-level
languages for script-based blockchains with formal secu-
rity proofs may also be a promising research direction.
• Design paradigms for Turing-complete blockchains.
Smart contracts in Turing-complete blockchains are at-
tracting most institutions and communities, which are
devoted to the exploration of best practices and design
paradigms. Additionally, some practical cryptographic
protocols, such as the distributed key generation pro-
tocol (DKG) [241], are migrated to Turing-complete
blockchains like Ethereum for the efficient realization
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without a trusted third party. Design paradigms for such
migrations might be a new research hotspot in the future.
• Design tools for Turing-complete blockchains.
Blockchains with Turing-complete languages support a
wide variety of smart contracts. While on the other side,
contract vulnerabilities are also emerging. As a result,
many contract analysis tools based on various methods
have emerged in recent years. Apart from commonly
used techniques such as symbolic execution, detection
tools based on fuzzing test are expected to become a new
main research direction. Besides, high-level languages
for Turing-complete blockchains with formal proofs may
also become a new research direction.
• Private contract systems. Many users are very cautious
about privacy issues and are thus reluctant to apply smart
contracts in their business activities. In recent years,
some researchers combine cryptographic solutions such
as secure multi-party computation, blind signatures, ring
signatures, group signatures, and zero-knowledge proofs
to propose private contract execution solutions. However,
due to the limitations on the state-of-the-art cryptographic
technology, existing solutions still have a large space
for improvements in terms of efficiency, storage and
others. Therefore, exploring efficient solutions for privacy
protection in smart contracts will be a promising research
direction as well.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have reviewed the studies on smart con-
tracts in the period 2008-2020 from the perspectives of design
paradigms, tools and systems. Firstly, we discuss and group
the contract construction schemes for two types of contract
platforms, i.e., script-based and Turing-complete blockchains.
The contract design paradigms and tools in these schemes
are designed to lower the technical barriers for smart contract
developers and facilitate the design of contracts. Secondly, we
summarize the deficiencies of the existing contract execution
mechanisms, and then explore and categorize the relevant
improvement solutions. Finally, we summarize the future
research directions on the aspects of contract construction
and execution schemes, aiming at providing insights for new
researchers and developers in this field.
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